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FINANCIAL MARKET BOTTLENECKS
AND THE “OPENNESS” MANDATE
FELIX B. CHANG †
Financial market infrastructures (“FMIs”), which facilitate
the execution of financial transactions, exhibit such strong
economies of scale that they are natural monopolies. In each
market, production is controlled by a few dominant players.
Federal courts have traditionally checked the abuses of natural
monopolies under the Sherman Act. Yet recent Supreme Court
decisions have reined in the role of antitrust in regulated
industries, where administrative bodies set and enforce standards.
To this effect, financial regulations require certain FMIs to grant
open, nondiscriminatory access to users.
This Article argues that weak “openness” regulations must
be buttressed by their antitrust counterpart—specifically, the
essential facilities doctrine, which enables an excluded user to sue
for wrongful denial of access to an FMI.
This Article situates FMIs at the intersection of four seismic
trends. First, the role of FMIs as a mitigant of systemic risk renders
their growth inevitable. Second, open access has become
fashionable in the regulation of other natural monopolies (e.g., net
neutrality rules), but this approach requires precise standards.
Third, essential facilities can supplement weak open access
regulations, but the doctrine was nearly dismantled by the
Supreme Court a decade ago. Finally, the balance between
antitrust and regulation is due to be reset, and the next move will
likely come from FMIs.
†
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Financial intermediaries—entities such as banks which serve
as conduits between investors and investment—benefit from
economies of scale. The larger an intermediary is, the cheaper its
services will be, which in turn attracts more customers.1 A subset of
financial intermediaries known as financial market infrastructures
(“FMIs”) exhibits such strong economies of scale that they are
natural monopolies—monopolies which arise because one producer
can serve the market more efficiently than multiple producers.2

RICHARD SCOTT CARNEY ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 39-40 (2013).
ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS
123-24 (1971); Shubha Ghosh, Decoding and Recoding Natural Monopoly,
Deregulation, and Intellectual Property, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1125, 1138–39
(2008).
1
2
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FMIs facilitate the execution of financial transactions.3 Like
other natural monopolies, FMIs dominate the markets that they
serve. For example, two credit card networks finance the lion’s share
of consumer transactions,4 while SWIFT is the primary payment
messaging system among banks.5
Prior to the financial crisis, little attention was paid to FMIs.
They had been eclipsed by more glamorous intermediaries such as
banks and hedge funds. Now, financial reform laws have catapulted
one type of FMI—derivatives clearinghouses—from obscurity to
prominence.6 A clearinghouse guarantees the trading activity of its
members.7 If a member cannot honor its obligations to the other
party in a trade, the clearinghouse will step in. 8 And if all trading
activity in the derivatives markets is backstopped by large, wellfunded clearinghouses, then the default of one member is less likely
to transmit contagion throughout the financial system.9
Lawmakers in the world’s biggest financial markets have
built risk management systems around derivatives clearinghouses.
For instance, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) directs approximately $700 trillion in
derivatives trades toward a handful of clearinghouses for
processing.10 Armed with this mandate and strong economies of
scale, clearinghouses have the propensity to distort competition.11
See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS & OICU-IOSCO, PRINCIPLES FOR FINANCIAL
MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES (2012), available at http://perma.cc/Z2DB-JPWP;
Federal Reserve, Oversight of Key Financial Market Infrastructures (2009),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/over_about.htm.
4 In 2013, Visa controlled 49.3% of the market share, Mastercard 30.8%,
Discover 10.7%, and American Express 9.2%. CardHub, Market Share by Credit
Card Network, http://www.cardhub.com/edu/market-share-by-credit-cardnetwork/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2015). See also Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The
Economic Costs of Credit Card Merchant Restraints, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1321, 1327
(2008).
5
SWIFT,
Company
Information,
http://www.swift.com/about_swift/company_information/company_informa
tion (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
6 Derivatives are financial instruments whose values fluctuate on the basis of
other variables, such as interest rates, stock prices, and even the weather. See
Norman Menachem Feder, Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 2002
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 677, 681–83 (2002). For the risks of derivatives, see Arthur
E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry,
1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV.
215, 337-73 (2002).
7 Yesha Yadav, The Problematic Case of Clearinghouses in Complex Markets,
101 GEO. L.J. 387, 408-13 (2013).
8 Id.
9 Id. at 410.
10 7 U.S.C. § 2(h) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(a)(1) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 8302(d)(1)
(2012). This number corresponds to the notional (or contract) value of the
3
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For all the attention paid to clearinghouses, little has been
made of their natural monopoly characteristics. Antitrust
considerations occupy only a small corner of Dodd-Frank,12 and with
few exceptions,13 scholars have not taken up the effects on
competition of large clearinghouses. This is not surprising; in the
aftermath of a crisis, industry and regulators are far too consumed
with the preservation of markets. But it would be a mistake to ignore
the antitrust implications of clearinghouses, because these entities sit
at the intersection of four seismic legal trends.
First, the primacy placed upon clearinghouses as a mitigant of
systemic risk renders their growth and consolidation inevitable. A
clearinghouse must be big if it is to buffer markets from the shock of
large-scale defaults.14 Yet if mismanaged, a large clearinghouse
becomes a bottleneck that stifles competition. Specifically, DoddFrank requires derivatives trades to run through clearinghouses (the
bottleneck facility).15 If a clearinghouse denies membership to
certain applicants, then those applicants will be unable to operate and
compete as traders of derivatives instruments.16
Second, the typical regulatory response to bottlenecks is a
requirement of open, nondiscriminatory access. Dodd-Frank features
such a requirement.17 In other areas where bottlenecks prevail, open
access rules are also the go-to solution. For instance, in
telecommunications, where internet service providers deliver web
content to consumers, scholars have pushed for “net neutrality” rules
that would restrict the ability of these providers to fast-track the
content of favored websites.18 In discrimination law, Joseph Fishkin

over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives markets. See Bank for Int’l Settlements,
Derivatives Statistics, tbl. 19 (Sept. 14, 2014), http://perma.cc/877HSL8C?type=pdf.
11 See infra Section II.B.
12 See infra Section III.B.
13 See Michael Greenberger, Diversifying Clearinghouse Ownership in Order to
Safeguard Free and Open Access to the Derivatives Clearing Market, 18
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 245 (2013).
14 Felix B. Chang, The Systemic Risk Paradox: Banks and Clearinghouses under
Regulation, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 101, 130-33 (2014).
15 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1a(15); 15 U.S.C. § 78c–3.
16 See infra Section II.B. This maneuver would be a classic form of vertical
exclusion. Vertical exclusion has inspired generations of controversy, though
the latest trend seems to be a validation of scholars who view this type of
exclusion as harmful. See infra text accompanying notes 66-74. One such
scholar, Jean Tirole, won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2014 for his work on
market power.
17 See infra Section III.B.1.
18 See, e.g., Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, J.
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003).
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has posited that intra-societal equality might be achieved if
bottlenecks which control access to opportunity are opened up.19
Third, regulatory open access requirements have traditionally
been bolstered by an antitrust doctrine derived from common law:
essential facilities. This doctrine requires the owner of a bottleneck
facility to grant access to all users—even rivals of the owner—if the
bottleneck is an infrastructure that cannot be feasibly duplicated.20 If
regulations are weak or nebulous, essential facilities provides
alternative recourse for the aggrieved competitor. Yet this doctrine
was all but dismantled by the Supreme Court in Verizon
Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko.21
Nonetheless, current antitrust litigation over FMIs may well
resuscitate essential facilities from the brink.22
Finally, the balance between antitrust and regulation is due to
be recalibrated. Since Trinko, academics have offered a flurry of
proposals to overhaul the role of antitrust in regulated industries.23
That balance often comes into play in essential facilities cases, where
a common law doctrine mirrors regulatory mechanisms for opening
up a bottleneck.24 Because of deregulation, administrative agencies
refrain from intrusive standard-setting, thereby forcing courts to
cobble together answers from common law when aggrieved
competitors sue.25 Consequently, the contours of “open access” may
be played out in private actions under the antitrust analog of essential
facilities.
In channeling these four trends, this Article clarifies the
antitrust peripheries of financial reform. Financial regulation has
spurred naturally monopolistic clearinghouses; yet regulation cannot
sufficiently deter the attendant effects on competition. Today’s
regulators favor a hands-off approach that merely sets the baseline
for open, nondiscriminatory access in the form of what this Article

JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (2014).
See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 611
(1985); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 382 (1973). See
also Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Essential Facilities
Doctrine: The Lost Message of Terminal Railroad, UC Berkeley Public Law
Research
Paper
No.
2407071
(2014),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2407071.
21 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
22 See infra Section III.C.
23 See Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 20; Adam Candeub, Trinko and ReGrounding the Refusal to Deal Doctrine, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 821 (2005); Brett
Frischmann & Spencer Weber Waller, Revitalizing Essential Facilities, 75
ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2008); Howard A. Shelanski, The Case for Rebalancing
Antitrust and Regulation, 109 MICH. L. REV. 683 (2011).
24 Trinko was such a case. See infra Section III.C.
25 See infra Section III.B.2.
19
20
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calls “openness” mandates.26 Openness mandates abound in
industries dominated by natural monopolies, but this approach
requires the promulgation and enforcement of rules which precisely
define “access.” Dodd-Frank falls short on both counts: its open
access rules are nebulous, and violations are difficult to patrol.
Consequently, this Article argues that the regulatory
mechanism for ensuring open access to derivatives clearinghouses
must be bolstered by a reinvigorated essential facilities doctrine. Yet
Supreme Court precedent stands in the way—most prominently,
Trinko. Thus, the recommendation to pair regulatory and antitrust
openness mandates must be tacked onto the groundswell to refine, if
not altogether undo, Trinko.
This Article contributes to the growing body of literature on
clearinghouses and FMIs27 and also wades into the debate over the
role of antitrust in regulated industries.28 First, this Article shows
how the balance between substantive regulation and competition
policy will be reshaped if courts hear essential facilities claims
against clearinghouses. This rebalancing is inevitable; for financial
regulators have abdicated their standard-setting duties in favor of
vague prescriptions about open, nondiscriminatory access. Second,
this Article illuminates the broad category of such prescriptions—in
the form of openness mandates—which encompass areas as disparate
as financial, telecommunications, and employment regulations.
The remainder of this Article unfolds as follows:
Section II analyzes the natural monopoly traits of FMIs,
focusing on derivatives clearinghouses. Clearinghouses tend to be
controlled by the dominant players in the downstream trading
market—that is, large financial institutions who are the primary
dealers of derivatives instruments.29 These institutions can strengthen

See infra Section II.A.
See, e.g., Chang, supra note 14; Yadav, supra note 7; Mark J. Roe,
Clearinghouse Overconfidence, 101 CAL. L. REV. 1641, 1672 (2013); Kristin N.
Johnson, Clearinghouse Governance: Moving Beyond Cosmetic Reform, 77
BROOK. L. REV. 681 (2012); Sean J. Griffith, Governing Systemic Risk: Towards a
Governance Structure for Derivatives Clearinghouses, 61 EMORY L.J. 1153
(2012); Jeremy C. Kress, Credit Default Swaps, Clearinghouses, and Systemic
Risk: Why Centralized Counterparties Must Have Access to Central Bank
Liquidity, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 49 (2011).
28 Compare Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412 (suggesting that antitrust should yield
where a regulatory structure exists to “deter and remedy anticompetitive
harm”), with Shelanski, supra note 23, at 685 (criticizing the Trinko court for
“discount[ing] the potential for antitrust to complement regulation and to fill
gaps where regulation is unsuccessful”).
29 In downstream (retail) markets, firms sell products to end users; in
upstream (wholesale) markets, firms sell to other firms. See OECD, DEFINING
THE RELEVANT MARKET IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS Ch. 2, p 14 (2014). For this
26
27
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their hand in the dealer market by denying their rivals access to
clearinghouses. Thus, clearinghouses present a novel setting for
harms such as leveraging and foreclosure that are commonly
associated with bottlenecks and vertical integration.
Section III canvasses the solutions to the anticompetitive
effects of natural monopoly, including regulatory and antitrust
mechanisms for ensuring open, nondiscriminatory access. Both sets
of solutions grew out of the centuries-old duties imposed upon
common carriers—businesses which interfaced with the general
public and were charged with providing an equal level of service to
all. Paradigmatic natural monopolies such as telecommunications
and transportation have experienced intensive regulation at some
point in their long histories, as well as antitrust actions brought by
the Department of Justice or private litigants. For derivatives
clearinghouses, however, financial regulators have adopted
extraordinarily weak safeguards against leveraging and foreclosure:
openness mandates which convey wide discretion to the regulated
entities themselves.
Part IV proposes that regulatory openness mandates be
buttressed by the essential facilities doctrine. Yet this proposal,
narrow as it is, must overcome Trinko, which counsels for antitrust to
yield in the face of regulation. Thus, this Section explores arguments
for and against the proposal, as well as the broader movement to
overhaul Trinko.
II.

NATURAL MONOPOLY TRAITS OF FMIS

This Section provides background on financial market
infrastructures (“FMIs”) and natural monopolies. It begins by
introducing several types of FMIs, focusing on derivatives
clearinghouses, which occupy a central place in financial reform.
Then this Section explains why clearinghouses should be classified
as natural monopolies—first because regulation now requires most
derivatives trades to run through clearinghouses, thereby ensuring
their essentialness to the financial markets, and second because their
economies-of-scale foster anticompetitive harms such as leveraging
and foreclosure.
A. Financial Market Infrastructures
The global economy depends on the smooth execution of
financial transactions. When a pension fund sells some of its
holdings in oil companies to buy stock in solar energy companies, or
Article’s purposes, the trading (or dealer) market is downstream; the clearing
market is upstream.
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when a consumer purchases groceries by swiping a credit card, a vast
system of interconnected financial networks perform the hidden,
back-office functions to complete the transactions. These networks
are comprised of FMIs, a broad class of intermediaries which
reconcile, confirm, record, transmit, clear, and settle transactions.30
FMIs include credit cards, which enable consumers to pay
merchants without the use of cash;31 interbank messaging systems,
which allow banks to transmit account and payment details;32 and
clearinghouses, which clear and settle trades in securities and
derivatives instruments.33 Less well known FMIs are securities
settlement systems, which register, settle, and memorialize securities
transactions; trade repositories, which collect and maintain data for
derivatives transactions; and electronic trading platforms, which
provide venues for trading financial instruments.34
There are slight differences in nomenclature when regulators
speak of FMIs. “Financial market infrastructures” is usually the term
preferred by non-U.S. regulators and international standard-setting
bodies, while Dodd-Frank uses “financial market utilities,” which
encompasses a narrower set of entities—clearinghouses, settlement
systems, and payment systems.35
Regardless of nomenclature, FMIs are colossal. In 2012, the
National Securities Clearing Corporation cleared $186 trillion in
See supra note 3.
Levitin, supra note 4, at 1329-30.
32 See SWIFT, supra note 5.
33 Clearing and settlement can be more precisely broken down into three
functions: (i) matching of orders, (ii) clearing of trades, and (iii) settlement
(ensuring payment by the purchaser and delivery by the seller). For excellent
summaries, see DERMOT TURING, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT IN EUROPE §§ 1.2-1.14
(2012); John McPartland, Clearing and Settlement Demystified, CHICAGO FED.
LET., no. 210 (2005).
34 See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS & OICU-IOSCO, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
SECURITIES SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS (2001),
at www.bis.org/publ/cpss42.pdf; Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council, Securities Settlement Systems, http://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/itbooklets/wholesale-payment-systems/securities-settlement-systems.aspx
(last visited Feb. 8, 2015); Karlo Kauko, Interlinking Securities Settlement
Systems: A Strategic Commitment? (ECB Working Paper No. 427; Bank of
Finland Discussion Paper No. 26/2003), 2005, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=501742;
European
Commission,
Central
Securities
Depositories
(2014),
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financialmarkets/central_securities_depositories/index_en.htm.
35 Compare BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS & OICU-IOSCO, supra note 3, and Bank
of England, Bank of England’s Supervision of Financial Market Infrastructures
(Mar. 2014), with 12 U.S.C. § 5462(6). See also Financial Stability Board, OTC
Derivatives Market Reforms: Fourth Progress Report on Implementation n.1
(Oct. 31, 2012).
30
31
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securities transactions. In the derivatives world, the notional (or
contractual) value of the over-the-counter derivatives market is even
bigger—roughly $700 trillion, divided among various financial
instruments.36 Clearinghouses of the InterContinental Exchange
(“ICE”) control a large chunk of the processing of those trades. In
2010, ICE Clear Europe cleared over $3 trillion in European credit
default swaps, and its affiliate ICE Trust U.S. cleared $6 billion in
similar instruments. Another example, drawn from payment
messaging and data transmission services, is SWIFT. SWIFT is a
member-owned cooperative that serves over 10,800 financial
institutions in 216 countries on any given day.37 Finally, for
consumers, Visa is perhaps the most familiar credit card network in
the world, with 2.2 billion cards issued by 14,300 financial
institutions and accepted by 36 million merchants.38 Other than credit
cards, these FMIs are the largest financial institutions that most of
the world has never heard of.
As the name suggests, financial market infrastructures (or
utilities) are a massive system of interlocking components that work
behind the scenes. They are often referred to as the “plumbing” of
global finance.39 To function smoothly, they must be large and
interconnected. Imagine the ensuing frustration, for instance, if
transactions in oil and solar company stocks were serviced by
different FMIs that could not reconcile transactions quickly. Our
pension fund may have to wait several days for the sale of its oil
holdings to settle before the funds came through to buy solar. In the
early years of the credit card industry, consumers faced somewhat
similar problems. Holders of American Express and Discover cards
had a comparatively difficult time paying with them because fewer
merchants were part of those credit card networks. American Express
and Discover had not attained the scale of subscription that enabled
them to enjoy network effects.40
Bank for Int’l Settlements, Derivatives Statistics, tbl. 19 (Sept. 14, 2014),
http://perma.cc/877H-SL8C?type=pdf. Derivatives can be divided into
exchange-traded and over-the-counter: the first category is traded on open
markets such as futures and options exchanges; the second category is
customized between the two parties to a trade. See Feder, supra note 6, at
731-36.
37 SWIFT, supra note 5 (follow link to SWIFT data for Dec. 2014).
38 Visa, Visa Transaction, http://usa.visa.com/about-visa/our-business/visatransaction.jsp (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).
39 See Ben S. Bernanke, Clearinghouses, Financial Stability, and Financial
Reform, remarks at Financial Markets Conference, Stone Mountain, Ga., Apr. 4,
2011,
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20110404a.ht
m.
40 See HERBERT HOVENKEMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLES AND EXCLUSION
(2006); Levitin, supra note 4, at 1363-65. Network effects means that an
36

SUBMISSION COPY

4/6/2015 8:10 AM

10

To illustrate an FMI’s network effects, we can take the
example of clearinghouses. A clearinghouse is a central
counterparty—or an entity that sits in the middle of financial activity
among numerous other parties—which effectively guarantees the
trades of its members (see Figure 1). A fundamental tenet of DoddFrank is to interpose central clearing onto the over-the-counter
derivatives markets and then closely regulating the providers of
clearing services. The statute does this in two parts. Title VII under
Dodd-Frank requires all derivatives trades to run through
clearinghouses called derivatives clearing organizations (“DCOs”).41
Title VIII governs financial market utilities such as DCOs and
central securities depositories, with heightened scrutiny over the
systemically important utilities.42
Figure 1: Centralized Clearing through a Clearinghouse*

* The light grey circle in the center is the clearinghouse. Dark grey
circles represent the clearinghouse members whose trades are backed
by the clearinghouse; black circles represent entities which are not
clearinghouse members but which trade with clearinghouse members.

In a centrally cleared trade, the buyer and seller transfer their
positions to a clearinghouse, so that the clearinghouse becomes a
buyer to every seller and a seller to every buyer.43 In this way, the
clearinghouse shoulders the risk that one party might default on its
obligations.
enterprise’s value increases if there are more users of the enterprise—a
telephone network, for example, becomes more valuable the more telephone
users there are. Levitin, supra note 4, at 1363.
41 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1a(15); 15 U.S.C. § 78c–3.
42 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5464.
43 This process is called “novation.” For a primer, see Darrell Duffie &
Haoxiang Zhu, Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce Counterparty
Risk?, 1 REV. ASSET PRICING STUD. 74, 77 (2011).
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Not every party in a trade has the right to clear through a
clearinghouse; only members of a clearinghouse have access, and
members are typically large financial institutions.44 This
membership-driven design allows clearinghouses to withstand a
certain degree of market volatility. Members back their positions by
posting collateral with the clearinghouse, and they also pay into a
default fund overseen by the clearinghouse.45 Thus, if one member
loses a substantial amount on a trade, the member can cover the loss
with posted collateral. If collateral is insufficient, or if multiple
members suffer staggering losses, the clearinghouse can tap the
default fund. Hence, the clearinghouse functions as a guarantor for
its members that also mutualizes, or dissipates, losses before they
spread to the rest of the financial markets.46
As with any guarantor, a clearinghouse tends to function
better if it is large. Large clearinghouses can amass a fortress of
collateral from broad membership to backstop trades. Further, large
clearinghouses can also net (or offset) more positions against each
other, which in turn lowers funding costs for trades and entrenches
the advantage of established clearinghouses.47
Yet a quandary plagues FMIs: the larger and more
interconnected an infrastructure, the more systemically significant it
becomes. If an FMI is jammed up, nations and industries will be
affected. And in times of crisis, the network itself can transmit
contagion.48
One way to conceptualize a clearinghouse is as a fortress
built upon a foundation of rock-solid members and their collateral
and guaranty fund. Another way, however, is as a conduit that
concentrates transmits risk in times of crisis. As the financial crisis
illustrated, a crisis can spark losses that are both severe and
correlated.49 They are severe in their degree and correlated in that
multiple firms are affected. The subprime mortgage meltdown, for
instance, touched wide swathes of the economy beyond the issuers of

See, e.g., ICE Clear Credit Participant List, INTERCONTINENTALEXCHANGE,
https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/clear_credit/ICE_Clear_Credit_Participa
nt_List.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2014) (listing affiliates of Bank of America,
Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman
Sachs, HSBC, JPMorgan, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Nomura, Société
Générale, Royal Bank of Novia Scotia, Royal Bank of Scotland, and UBS as
members).
45 Roe, supra note 27, at 1660.
46 For a nuanced analysis of mutualization, see id. at 1660, 1675-80.
47 For a similarly nuanced analysis of netting, see id. at 1660-62. For examples
of how a clearinghouse’s harnesses netting to mitigate risk and reduce
collateral requirements, see Kress, supra note 27, at 66-69.
48 Chang, supra note 14, at 133-34.
49 Id.
44
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those mortgages—from the banks which packaged and trafficked in
mortgage derivatives to the pension funds and municipalities that
bought them. If a clearinghouse has numerous members whose
volatile investments crash simultaneously, and if circuit breakers
such as the default fund are insufficient, then the systemically
significant clearinghouse could fail. Otherwise healthy members
could simultaneously be taken down because the clearinghouse
would turn to them for support.50
The failure of a clearinghouse is not pure speculation. On
occasion, clearinghouses have failed in the past—or come very close
to failing. Most notably, Options Clearing Corporation, the world’s
largest options clearinghouse, run by the Chicago Board Options
Exchange, nearly had to ask for access to the Federal Reserve’s
Discount Window during the financial crisis in 2008.51 In 1987, after
the stock market crash known as Black Monday, the Federal Reserve
did have to step in to shore up capital and confidence in OCC when
its funds became insufficient to weather its members’ losses.52 That
year, the clearinghouse for the Hong Kong Futures Exchange, ICCH
Hong Kong, also went under.53 Nonetheless, clearinghouses have
generally worked well in the past and have been able to harness their
default management procedures to minimize disruptions to the
economy.54
One major caveat to their continued success, however, is the
sheer scale of trading activity being pushed to central counterparties.
During the financial crisis, the leaders of the G-20 recognized that
the most significant source of systemic risk laid in the over-thecounter (formerly uncleared) derivatives markets.55 The consensus
resulted in a concerted push to mandate central clearing in these
markets, whose size boggles the mind. The past six years have
witnessed the propulsion of nearly $700 trillion in trades toward
clearinghouses. This figure dwarfs the size of almost any other

Roe, supra note 27, at 1675-80.
Nina Mehta, Options Clearinghouse Lobbies for Access to Fed Funding During
Emergencies, BLOOMBERG NEWS, June 23, 2010, http://perma.cc/9R8T-DMRF;
Kress, supra note 27, at 50.
52 Ben S. Bernanke, Clearing and Settlement During the Crash, 3 REV. FIN. STUD.
133, 146-50 (1990); U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, THE OCTOBER 1987
MARKET BREAK (1988).
53 Robert Steigerwald, Central Counterparty Clearing and Systemic Risk
Regulation (2014), manuscript on file with author; SECURITIES REVIEW
COMMITTEE, THE OPERATION AND REGULATION OF THE HONG KONG SECURITIES
INDUSTRY (1988).
54 For a noteworthy example, see infra note 79.
55 Group of Twenty (G-20), Leader’s Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit (Sept.
24-25, 2009).
50
51
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financial market on earth by an order of magnitude.56 Although
DCOs are being built upon a model of central counterparties that has
existed for over a century, it is the breadth of their responsibility that
raises concern. Industry and regulators may not have had enough
time to think through all the contingencies—nor, arguably, the
wherewithal to arrest the velocity of contagion should even a fraction
of this market crash again.
B. FMIs as Natural Monopolies
A natural monopoly arises when a market is more efficiently
serviced by one producer than multiple ones. This condition is
known as subadditivity, where costs are lower when one firm
produces all goods than any combination of additional firms
divvying up the output.57 The monopoly supplier cannot be
disciplined by competition, either because (i) average costs decrease
with increasing production, so the incumbent supplier will always be
cheaper, or (ii) entry into the market requires enormous investment,
so insurgents are deterred by (or the government must product the
incumbent’s) sunk costs.58 Common examples of natural monopoly
occur in transportation, utilities, and telecommunications, industries
characterized at some point by intensive regulation which permitted
single-firm dominance in exchange for rate-setting.59
FMIs, too, have been observed to be natural monopolies.60
Due to the network effects of established FMIs, insurgents find it
very difficult to wrench away market share. The early challenges of
American Express and Discover in competing with the established
payment systems of Visa and Mastercard, for example, became the
basis for extensive litigation. In 1991, Visa U.S.A. added a section to
See Steve Denning, Big Banks and Derivatives: Why Another Financial Crisis
Is Inevitable, FORBES (Jan. 8, 2013), http://perma.cc/6Z32-NHC4 (comparing
the OTC derivatives market to the size of the global economy); Back to the
futures?, ECONOMIST, Feb. 4, 2013 (comparing the OTC derivatives market to
the size of the world’s securities markets); OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY (OCC), OCC’S QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES
ACTIVITIES, THIRD QUARTER 2014 table 1 (2014) (listing the notional values of
OTC versus exchange-traded derivatives).
57 Ramsi A. Woodcock, Inconsistency in Antitrust, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 105, n.87
(2013).
58 LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 742 (West Academic Publ’g, 2d ed. 2006); Ghosh, supra
note 2, at 1138–39; SANFORD V. BERG & JOHN TSCHIRHART, NATURAL MONOPOLY
REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 21–24 (1988); DANIEL F. SPULBER,
REGULATION AND MARKETS 3–5, 42–43 (1989).
59 See infra Section III.A.
60 See Thanh Tu Nguyen, EC Antitrust Law in Payment Card Systems, Master’s
Thesis, Lund University (2003) (analyzing the network effects of credit cards).
56
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its bylaws which automatically terminated any merchant from the
Visa network if the merchant were to issue American Express,
Discover, or any other card which competes with Visa.61 Visa
considered expanding this exclusivity rule to its foreign affiliates,
and litigation soon followed.62 In Europe, American Express and the
bank Dean Witter contended that the exclusivity rule would restrain
competition among credit card systems, since rivals of Visa would be
foreclosed from entering markets which Visa had already
penetrated.63 In the U.S., the Department of Justice successfully sued
Visa and Mastercard (which also enacted an exclusivity rule) for
violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act.64 Ironically, nearly 20 years
later, DOJ would also sue American Express for a
“nondiscrimination provision” in its governing documents which
compels members to favor American Express at the expense of its
rivals.65
Slightly less well-known, though perhaps more salient, are
the competitive advantages of large, established clearinghouses.
Large clearinghouses can draw upon a broad membership to offset
counterparty liabilities and thereby lower the amount of required
collateral. As observed in the prior Subsection, large clearinghouses
enjoy a competitive advantage because of their availability to tap a
broader membership pool and, therefore, more positions to net
against one another. Superior netting ability translates into lower
clearing and settlement prices. Not surprisingly, clearing markets
tend to be dominated by the early entrants and are very difficult to
penetrate for newcomers.66
Large, naturally monopolistic clearinghouses threaten
competition in two ways: foreclosure and leveraging. These two
dangers are often interrelated in a bottleneck facility. For
clearinghouses in particular, smaller users might be blocked from
access if incumbent clearinghouse members (which tend to be large
financial institutions) set membership requirements too high.67 And

Id. at 40.
Id.
63 Id.
64 See U.S. v Visa USA Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
65 See Plaintiff’s Pre-Trial Memorandum, U.S. v. American Express Co., No. 10CV-04496 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).
66 The Chicago Mercantile Exchange has long dominated agricultural futures,
the Options Clearing Corporation securities futures, and LCH credit default
swaps in Europe. For an analysis of similar trends in exchanges, see U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, Review of the Regulatory Structure Associated with Financial
Institutions, Comments before the Dep’t of the Treasury 10 (Jan. 31, 2008).
67 See C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182, 1201
(2013) (“In the simplest story, the excluders act on their own, without
enlisting assistance from other parties, to raise the costs of market entry. The
61
62
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given Dodd-Frank’s central clearing mandate, if the excluded users
are also sellers of derivatives instruments, then their very survival is
impugned, as their products will be unable to be cleared. (For a
rendering of the clearinghouse as a bottleneck facility, see Figure 2.)
Figure 2: The Clearinghouse as Bottleneck
CH Member

CH Member

CH Member

Clearinghouse (“CH”)

Downstream Dealer Market
As often happens, a natural monopoly may become a
bottleneck facility by which the facility’s owners can strengthen their
hand in the downstream market by constricting access of the owners’
competitors to the bottleneck itself.68 The ability to parlay the market
dominance of a bottleneck facility into dominance over an adjacent
market is known a leveraging.69 Classically a Section 2 claim under
the Sherman Act, leveraging is one form of abuse of dominance by a

excluders might manipulate a standard-setting process to exclude the rival,
engineer product incompatibility, or game the regulatory system.”).
68 See RUBEN LEE, RUNNING THE WORLD’S MARKETS: THE GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL
INFRASTRUCTURE 21 (2011).
69 This harm is particularly acute where industries are vertically integrated.
See Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, A Primer on Foreclosure 1, in HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION III (Mark Armstrong & Rob Porter eds., 2006).
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monopolist, by which two distinct monopolies charging two sets of
monopoly rents are created.70
For decades, leveraging was criticized in another theory,
whose most prominent adherent was the Chicago School of
economics.71 As the Chicago School argued, a monopolist in one
market has no need to leverage its way to dominance over a second
market; for the monopolist could maximize profits simply by
charging supracompetitive prices in the first market.72 This was
known as the single monopoly profit theory. Extended to
clearinghouses, the single monopoly profit theory might posit that a
dominant dealer of credit default swaps need not simultaneously
corner the upstream clearing market by way of a proxy
clearinghouse; for the dealer could make more money by charging
higher prices for credit default swaps in the downstream retail market
for those products.73
But leveraging has been regaining traction.74 Economists
Patrick Rey and Jean Tirole have shown that the refusal of a
bottleneck facility’s owners to deal with rivals could be a tactic of
raising those rivals’ costs.75 This problem is especially pronounced if
the owners are dominant players in a downstream market (e.g.,
dealers, or sellers, of derivatives) which band together to deny access
to an essential upstream facility (e.g., clearinghouses).76 Such a
scenario might unfold in the financial markets as follows: the largest
See Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 305 F.3d 89,
108 (2d Cir. 2002) (listing the elements of a leveraging claim as (i) possession
of monopoly power in one market, (ii) using that power to gain a competitive
advantage in another distinct market, and (iii) thereby causing injury) (citing
Virging Atl. Airways v. British Airways, 257 F.3d 256, 272 (2d Cir. 2001).
71 See, e.g., Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage
Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); Richard S. Markovits, Tie-ins, Reciprocity, and
the Leverage Theory, 76 YALE L.J. 1397 (1967); Richard S. Markovits, Tie-ins,
Leverage, and the American Antitrust Laws, 80 YALE L.J. 195 (1970); Richard A.
Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979).
72 HERBERT HOEVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND
ITS PRACTICE § 7.9 (4th ed. 2010).
73 There are additional questions that supporters and detractors of the single
monopoly profit theory would wrestle over. For instance, how much market
power does the dealer possess? Also, how many other dealers are on similar
footing? These are critical inquiries because the derivatives dealer market is
often cornered by a consortium of big banks which compete with one another.
See infra note 85 and accompanying text. Of course, such competition among
large dealers does not obviate parallel exclusion by those dealers as a bloc
against smaller dealers. See Hemphill & Wu, supra note 67.
74 See Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single
Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397 (2009).
75 See Rey & Tirole, supra note 69. For a concise summary of Rey and Tirole’s
arguments, see Candeub, supra note 23, at 852-53.
76 Id.
70
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four credit default swap (“CDS”) dealers—which, incidentally, tend
to also be the most powerful members of CDS clearinghouses—
might somehow restrict the access of smaller dealers to a CDS
clearinghouse, thereby frustrating the efforts of excluded dealers to
sell CDS. Because Dodd-Frank requires most derivatives trades to
pass through a clearinghouse, the clearing function has become
essential, or indispensable, to the trading function. Smaller dealers
without access to clearinghouses have to clear through the large
banks which are clearinghouse members or face the risk that
customers of smaller dealers will simply migrate to the large dealers.
The choice is one between paying for access to a clearinghouse and
abandoning the dealer market altogether.
Rey and Tirole’s findings directly refute the argument that a
monopolist in one market need not leverage its way to dominance in
another market to extract monopoly rents. Control of a bottleneck
facility in an upstream market may help the monopolist in a
downstream market maintain its dominance.
Whatever its theoretical underpinnings, leverage and
foreclosure have been pervasive fears for competitors of the large
derivatives dealers. In 2010, shortly after Dodd-Frank’s passage, the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) convened a
roundtable with prominent leaders from industry and academia to
discuss the implementation of the act’s central clearing mandate.77
An enduring thread throughout the conversation was the likelihood
of large banks excluding their smaller competitors from
clearinghouses by ratcheting up the requirements for membership—
all in the guise of risk mitigation.78 Such a tactic would preserve the
dominance of large banks in the dealer market by preventing smaller
dealers from accessing clearinghouses.
See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n & Securities & Exchange Comm’n,
Public Roundtable on Governance and Conflicts of Interest in the Clearing and
Listing of Swaps, Washington, D.C., Aug. 20, 2010 [hereinafter CFTC
Roundtable].
78 See id. at 25-26:
77

The LCH is a closed system. It requires that one have not only
$5 billion of net capital but $1 trillion of [sic] swaps already
cleared . . . . [I]f we're going to be really clever about keeping
people out of the system, the system is not going to work
effectively. We're going to have the same OTC style, bilateral,
closed, untransparent, opaque, risky system. And what we
need to do is allow more entrants to diversify risk, address
too big to fail and too interconnected to fail.”) (comments of
Jason Kastner, Vice Chairman, Swaps & Derivatives Assoc.).
Kastner begins by referring to LCH, a dominant European clearinghouse
whose significance is discussed infra in notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
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The oft-cited example of aggressive membership criteria is
LCH.Clearnet, a U.K.-based clearing consortium specializing in
interest rate swaps.79 Prior to 2012, LCH.Clearnet’s SwapClear
platform used to require that its members maintain an outstanding
portfolio of $1 trillion in interest rate swaps,80 a requirement widely
seen as keeping out all but the largest institutional sellers of these
instruments.81 SwapClear removed this condition the year after the
CFTC promulgated a series of rules designed to open up access to
derivatives clearinghouses.82 Yet even today, three years after the
elimination of that membership criterion, SwapClear members
remain the goliaths of global finance.83
The profile of SwapClear reveals that the movers of the
interest rate swaps market are also the members of a dominant
clearinghouse for interest rate swaps. This pattern is replicated in
other derivatives markets. For example, ICE Clear Credit, a major
clearinghouse for credit default swaps, also touts a membership list
that includes the largest financial institutions.84 The concentration of
the dealer market within the hands of a few large players is best
illustrated with numbers. In the U.S., the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (“OCC”) publishes a quarterly ranking of the banks
with the largest derivatives trading activity. In combing through
those quarterly reports, one finds that the same four or five
institutions perennially tower above everyone else. In its most recent
report, the OCC noted that “[d]erivatives activity in the U.S. banking
system continues to be dominated by a small group of large financial

LCH.Clearnet became especially prominent during the financial crisis, when
it cushioned the markets from the default by a Lehman Brothers affiliate of $9
trillion in interest rate swaps. See Natasha de Terán, How the World’s Largest
Default Was Unraveled, FIN. NEWS (Oct. 13, 2008), http://perma.cc/JB66-52TV;
Press Release, LCH.Clearnet, $9 Trillion Lehman OTC Interest Rate Swap
Default Successfully Resolved (Oct. 8, 2008), http://perma.cc/KFF6-L9WH.
80 See LCH.Clearnet, Submission of Amendments to the Clearinghouse Rules 3,
Submission to the Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n (Apr. 16, 2012),
available
at
http://www.cftc.gov/stellent/groups/public/@rulesandproducts/documents
/ifdocs/rul041612lch001.pdf.
81 See supra note 78; TURING, supra note 33, at § 5.6(3).
82 Derivatives Clearing Organization General Provisions and Core Principles,
76 Fed. Reg. 69334 (Nov. 8, 2011) [hereinafter DCO Core Principles].
83
See
SwapClear,
Our
Clearing
Members,
http://www.swapclear.com/service/our-members.html
(listing,
as
SwapClear’s U.S.-domiciled members, affiliates of Barclays, BNP Paribas,
Citibank, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan,
Morgan, Nomura, UBS, and Wells Fargo) (last visited Feb. 10, 2015).
84 See supra note 44.
79
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institutions. Four large commercial banks represent 92.6 % of the
total banking industry notional amounts.”85
Against this backdrop, it becomes clear that the fight over
access to clearinghouses is the proxy for a confrontation with much
more at stake: control of the adjacent derivatives dealer market. As
one panelist on the CFTC Roundtable noted:
96 percent of the swap market is executed by the
largest 10 banks. I think they call that an oligopoly.
And the notion is if you introduce more competition
into that 40 to 60 billion dollars which are at risk or
being earned by execution [trading or selling], that’s
where the pushing and shoving begins. It's not about
clearing per se; it's about competition for execution in
interest rate swaps and CDS.86
In other words, the derivatives dealer market is where the real action
lies. Profits in the dealer market dwarf profits in the clearing
market,87 which are fairly efficient already.88 If anything, the dealer
markets are more opaque—an opacity that stems from the high
degree of concentration and results in supracompetitive prices.89
III.

TRADITIONAL SOLUTIONS FOR NATURAL MONOPOLY

This Section canvasses the solutions to natural monopoly
problems of leverage and foreclosure. It begins broadly, with the
history of natural monopoly regulation in the United States. This
history has culminated in a blurry set of obligations which this
Article calls the “openness mandate.”
The openness mandate has its roots in the nondiscrimination
duties of common carriers devised centuries ago under English
OCC, supra note 56, at 1.
CFTC Roundtable, supra note 77, at 47 (comments of Jason Kastner).
87 See id. at 33 (“[A]nnually, there's estimated to be about 3- to $500 million
made clearing, and there are between 40- and $60 billion being made trading.
So this discussion of clearing and access to clearing is really just a proxy about
access to trading, because that's where the revenues are.”) (comments of
Randy Kroszner, Professor of Economics, University of Chicago Booth School
of Business).
88
See J.P.Morgan, Competition or Consolidation: The Outlook for
Interoperability among European CCPs, in THOUGHT (2012).
89 See Wallace Tuberville, Derivatives Clearinghouses in the Era of Financial
Reform (Oct. 24, 2010), http://www.rooseveltinstitute.org/derivativesclearinghouses-era-financial-reform (chronicling how the big banks shunned
efforts by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange to introduce transparency into the
pricing of credit default swaps).
85
86
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common law and codified in U.S. and English statutes governing
railroads in the 1800s.90 By an accident of deregulation, the openness
mandate has become the reigning approach toward overseeing
industries characterized by a high degree of vertical integration.
This Section then explores the interplay of openness
mandates in regulation and antitrust governing certain market
infrastructures (specifically, derivatives clearinghouses), which are
natural monopolies that can become competition-stifling bottlenecks.
Because regulators have come to favor a gentler approach toward
natural monopolies, financial market bottlenecks only have to
contend with the openness mandate. In isolation, neither the
regulatory openness mandate nor its antitrust analog is sufficient to
deter the abuses of market dominance.
A. Utility Regulation and the Openness Mandate
The traditional response to natural monopoly used to be
public utility regulation, where a producer’s monopoly is protected
from competition in exchange for a broad duty to serve the public.
Consequently, the monopoly submits to intimate regulation,
particularly of the rates it charges consumers.91 Deviation from
preset rates must clear both regulators and the public, in the venue of
public hearings.92
Paradigmatic natural monopolies fall into two camps. In one
camp is the classic public utility—a power company, for instance,
which generates and delivers electricity.93 The other camp consists of
common carriers such as railroads which are obligated to serve the
public on an open, nondiscriminatory basis.94 Both utility and
common-carrier regulations share the same roots in the Interstate
Commerce Act of 1887. This act formulated the strict rate-setting
rule known as the filed rate doctrine, pursuant to which regulated

James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to
Internet Interconnection, 54 FED. COMMUNICATIONS L.J. 225, 251-52 (2003).
91 See SPULBER, supra note 58, at 271-79.
92 Id. at 271
93 The primary regulator of power companies in the U.S., the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, is empowered by the Federal Power Act of 1935 to
ensure that wholesale prices are “just and reasonable.” See Richard Gilbert &
David Newberry, Market Power in US and EU Electricity Generation 169-70, in
ANTITRUST AND REGULATION IN THE EU AND US (François Lévêque & Howard
Shelanski eds., 2009).
94 See Susan P. Crawford, Transporting Communications, 89 B.U. L. REV. 871,
878-80 (2009).
90
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entities were to file their rates with the Interstate Commerce
Commission.95
Yet a public utility or common carrier framework cannot be
practicably adapted to clearinghouse regulation, for reasons which
are both technical and doctrinal. Technically, an intensive approach
such as the filed rate doctrine would require the CFTC or SEC to
scrutinize clearinghouse fee structures to ensure that they are
adjusted if costs fluctuate. Clearinghouses would be obliged to serve
far more counterparties than they currently do, with less discretion to
exclude on the basis of risk. While this would minimize the
possibility of price discrimination among participants, oversight this
close would demand a level of expertise that regulators do not
possess.96 Clearinghouse cost and fee structures are extremely
difficult to assess. Numerous clearinghouses, particularly in the
futures markets, are vertically integrated with exchanges.97 These
proprietary clearinghouses can bury clearing and settlement
surcharges in trading fees assessed by the exchange, or vice versa.98
Not surprisingly, advocates of utility treatment for FMIs do not find
that theirs is a mainstream position.99
The more compelling explanation for why utility treatment
would be untenable is the paradigm shift that natural monopoly
Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of
Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1330-34 (1998).
96 See CFTC Roundtable, supra note 77, at 100 (“I think a regulator has to be
very careful in second guessing experience to risk managers.”) (comments of
Bill Naven, Options Clearing Corporation); 102 (“I would certainly encourage
the CFTC and the SEC to reach out to those risk managers to get their direct
views on how these risks and these conflicts are best managed.”) (comments
of Bill Hill, Morgan Stanley). See also DCO Core Principles, supra note 82, at
69477-78 (comments of Commissioner Scott O’Malia).
97 Neal L. Wolkoff & Jason B. Werner, The History of Regulation of Clearing in
the Securities and Futures Markets, and Its Impact on Competition, 30 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 313, 374 (2010). Exchanges create a marketplace for the
purchase and sale of financial instruments, while clearinghouses ensure the
fulfillment of obligations by the buyer and seller. Chang, supra note 14, at 11415.
98 These are common tactics of vertically integrated enterprises. For some
perspective, see SPULBER, supra note 58, at 277-79.
99 But see Paul Tucker, Are Clearinghouses the New Central Banks?, Keynote
Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Over-the-Counter Derivatives
Symposium,
Apr.
11,
2014,
Chicago,
available
at
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/others/events/2014/annual_over_
the_counter_derivatives_symposium/tucker_clearinghouses_new_central_ban
ks_tucker_2014.pdf. The former Deputy Governor of the Bank of England,
Tucker is a powerful, if lone, voice to the contrary. See also Stephen J. Lubben,
Nationalize the Clearinghouses! (Seton Hall Public Law Research Paper No.
2458506),
2014,
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2458506.
95
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regulation has undergone in the past 40 years. Commonly but
inaccurately called deregulation, this trend has supplanted rate
regulation in favor of a framework where regulators simply set
ground rules designed to maximize competition within an
industry.100 It is the product of decades of assault upon heavy-handed
regulation, resulting in a lighter regulatory touch that heralds
competition above all else, including the public interest.101
The best example of this shift is the Telecommunications Act
of 1996. Prior to the Telecommunications Act, the handful of
companies controlling the provision of local and long-distance
telephone services were insulated from competition in return for a
broad commitment to serve all callers.102 These companies were the
“Baby Bells,” the survivors of a 1984 divestiture of AT&T by the
Justice Department.103 In 1996, however, the Telecommunications
Act revolutionized the regulatory philosophy. Under this act, the
Baby Bells had to make way for competition from insurgents known
as “competitive local exchange carriers.”104 The mechanism for
doing so was an interconnectivity mandate that enabled the insurgent
carriers to access the incumbents’ local telephone exchange
networks. It was an approach that had not been entertained in the
prior rounds of antitrust action against AT&T.105 The magnitude of
this reorientation is difficult to overstate. Telecommunications
regulators had moved from a rubric of constant and intrusive
supervision to one revolving around a broad but less intensive duty
of interconnection—a duty premised upon the obligation to grant
access to, or deal with, rivals.
This duty has taken on different names in different settings,
including “open access,” “duty to deal,” and “nondiscrimination.”106
For cohesion, this Article refers to this general set of obligations as
the openness mandate.
Antecedents of the openness mandate stretch back to the duty
of reasonable care imposed by medieval law upon tradesmen who
held themselves out to the general public; over time, its prescriptions
broadened into the common carrier duty to serve, even as its
coverage narrowed to trades whose practitioners effectively wielded
a monopoly—particularly trades associated with transportation, such
as innkeepers.107 In the U.S., common carrier duties made their early
Kearney & Merrill, supra note 95, at 1324-26.
Id.
102 Id. at 1351-52.
103 Id. at n.127; Hemphill & Wu, supra note 67, at 1199.
104 Glen O. Robinson, On Refusing to Deal with Rivals, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1177,
1217-23 (2002).
105 Id. at 1217.
106 See, e.g., Kearney & Merrill, supra note 95, at 1352.
107 Speta, supra note 90, at 255-56.
100
101
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appearance in iconoclastic cases pertaining to public utilities and
railroads in the 1800s.108 Through the ebbs and flows of rate
regulation and deregulation, some of the core characteristics of
common carrier duties have endured—namely, the duty to openly
serve, on a nondiscriminatory basis, a broad class of consumers.109
Today, even the fiercest detractors of telecom monopolies
seem to have accepted the immovability of this philosophy—that
competition is the ultimate aspiration, best safeguarded by foisting a
duty to deal upon the monopolist. For instance, one especially
contentious debate concerns the “net neutrality” obligations of
internet service providers, which deliver web content to consumers
and other users. On one side are the internet service providers
themselves, many of whom are Baby Bells, advocating for a right to
speed up the delivery of content for certain websites; on the other
side is a diverse alliance that includes academics and consumer
advocates, arguing that fast-tracking certain content would be
discriminatory.110 Yet as this debate rages on, critics of the dominant
internet service providers have merely argued against preferential
treatment, without suggesting a paradigm-shifting alternative for
regulation.
To be sure, the openness mandate conveys numerous
benefits: it eschews labor-intensive rate-setting as well as wrangling
over the proper measure of consumer welfare; instead, it imposes a
clear baseline of open, nondiscriminatory access for competitors.
Nonetheless, the openness mandate also entails some drawbacks.
One drawback is the ambiguous relationship between regulatory and
common law openness mandates. Most prominently, there is a
vestige of common carrier duties which lingers in antitrust. It takes
the form of the essential facilities doctrine. But before exploring the
antitrust antecedent, this Article will first examine the openness
mandate in financial reform regulation.
B. Nondiscriminatory Access in Financial Reform Regulation
Like their counterparts in telecom, financial regulators have
adopted openness mandates as the preferred method of patrolling
access to bottlenecks in the financial markets. Dodd-Frank itself
imposes open, nondiscriminatory access obligations for derivatives
clearinghouses. Yet compared to the other facets of clearinghouse
E.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1876); Interstate Commerce Act of
1887, 24 Stat. 379 (1887). See also Speta, supra note 90, at 251-52.
109 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 95, at 1349-53.
110 Tim Wu, Net Neutrality: Competition, Innovation, and Nondiscriminatory
Access, Testimony before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Telecom &
Antitrust
Task
(2006),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=903118.
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regulation, the provisions of Dodd-Frank addressing competition are
weak and ambiguous.
1.

The Eligibility Rule

The statutory architecture of Dodd-Frank mandates central
clearing under Title VII and close scrutiny over clearinghouses and
other financial market utilities under Title VIII.111 Oversight of
clearinghouses can be exacting and rigorous—the Federal Reserve,
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) have the authority to
prescribe strict rules on capital adequacy, risk management, default
procedures, and collateral requirements.112 Additionally, Title VIII
also permits access to central bank funds during a liquidity crunch.113
From these perspectives, there is no question that clearinghouses are
heavily regulated firms much like large market players in industries
with a legacy of rate setting.114
Concerning competition policy, however, Dodd-Frank is
hazier. Section 725(c) of the act mandates, among other goals, (i)
that derivatives clearing organizations (“DCOs”) establish
“appropriate admission and continuing eligibility standards” and (ii)
that DCO participation and membership requirements “be
objective[,] be publicly disclosed[,] and permit fair and open
access.”115 This is Core Principle C, one of several aspirational
principles for clearinghouses found within the Commodity Exchange
Act. Other core principles speak to risk management,116 default
rules,117 recordkeeping,118 antitrust considerations,119 governance,120
and conflicts of interest.121
In essence, Core Principle C aims to prevent a clearinghouse
from setting admission standards so high as to exclude the
See supra notes 41 and 42 and accompanying text. Jurisdiction over
clearinghouses is split between the SEC and CFTC. The two agencies have
adopted similar regulatory approaches, but this Article will focus on
clearinghouses under the CFTC’s jurisdiction.
112 12 U.S.C. § 5464(c).
113 See 12 U.S.C. § 5465(b) (2012). See also Colleen Baker, The Federal Reserve
as Last Resort, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 69 (2012).
114 This notion of “regulated firms” carries additional significance under
antitrust, where, for many years, the pervasiveness of regulation meant that
antitrust would defer. See infra Section III.C.
115 7 U.S.C. § 7A-1(c)(2)(C) (emphasis added).
116 Core Principle D, codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7A-1(c)(2)(D).
117 Core Principle G, codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7A-1(c)(2)(G).
118 Core Principle K, codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7A-1(c)(2)(K).
119 Core Principle N, codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7A-1(c)(2)(N).
120 Core Principle O, codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7A-1(c)(2)(O).
121 Core Principle P, codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7A-1(c)(2)(P).
111

4/6/2015 8:10 AM

SUBMISSION COPY

2015]

FINANCIAL MARKET BOTTLENECKS

25

competitors of its powerful members, the dominant derivatives
dealers. Yet its language merely says, unhelpfully, that clearinghouse
admission standards are to be “appropriate” and clearinghouse access
is to be “fair and open.”122
Implementing Core Principle C is a rule on participant and
product eligibility which defines fair and open access as follows:
(i) A [DCO] shall not adopt restrictive clearing
member standards if less restrictive requirements that
achieve the same objective and that would not
materially increase risk . . . could be adopted;
(ii) A [DCO] shall allow all market participants who
satisfy participation requirements to become clearing
members;
(iii) A [DCO] shall not exclude or limit clearing
membership of certain types of market participants
unless the [DCO] can demonstrate that the restriction
is necessary to address credit risk or deficiencies . . .
(iv) A [DCO] shall not require that clearing members
be swap dealers.
(v) A [DCO] shall not require that clearing members
maintain a swap portfolio of any particular size, or
that clearing members meet a swap transaction
volume threshold.123
This Eligibility Rule operates on two fronts: by forcing
clearinghouses to articulate objective and least-restrictive standards
for membership and by preventing clearinghouses from pegging
membership to size or volume thresholds. It neutralizes the
propensity of large dealers to couch denials of access to
clearinghouses as risk management decisions.

Id. at § 7A-1(c)(2)(C).
17 C.F.R. 39.12(a)(1) [hereinafter the Eligibility Rule]. A similar rule has
been promulgated by the SEC for clearing agencies under its jurisdiction. See
17 C.F.R. 240.17Ad-22; Clearing Agency Standards for Operation and
Governance, 76 Fed. Reg. 14472 (Mar. 16, 2011). However, this Article focuses
on open access rules for DCOs under the CFTC’s jurisdiction. Further, this
Article does not cover the rest of the rule on participant and product
eligibility, which is voluminous. For instance, 17 C.F.R. 39.12(a)(2) pertains to
what DCOs can require of their members in the way of financial resources.
Most notably, DCOs cannot set a minimum capital requirement of more than
$50 million. 17 C.F.R. 39.12(a)(2)(iii). Technically, that prohibition has no
bearing on fair and open access. See DCO Core Principles, supra note 82, at
69476 n.307.
122
123
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Apart from Core Principle C and the Eligibility Rule, DoddFrank also stipulates (i) that clearinghouses shall not unreasonably
restrain trade or “impose any material anticompetitive burden”124 and
(ii) that the act itself shall not “be construed to modify, impair, or
supersede the operation of any of the antitrust laws.”125 The former is
Core Principle N. The latter is an antitrust savings clause, preserving
antitrust enforcement in the face of substantive regulation. Together,
these four provisions comprise the constellation of Dodd-Frank’s
pronouncements on competition policy.126
2.

Problems with the Eligibility Rule

Dodd-Frank’s pronouncements on competition policy—and
the Eligibility Rule in particular—suffer from several major
problems. First and foremost, the provisions are vague. Second, they
convey wide discretion to clearinghouses, the regulated entities
themselves, to justify denials of access. Finally, given the highly
technical nature of membership determination, infractions could be
difficult to detect. Ultimately, regulators and competitors may have
to turn to the voluminous but inconsistent body of antitrust case law
to give shape to the parameters of Dodd-Frank’s openness mandate.
While lawmakers can easily mandate open access to a
bottleneck, the precise meaning of concepts such as “fairness,”
“open,” and even “nondiscriminatory” is elusive.127 This chasm,
between a sweeping mandate and systematic implementation, haunts
other areas of law. Parallels can be found in areas that work with
equality principles, such as antidiscrimination laws; usually,
however, the mandate of nondiscrimination is clarified by extensive
regulation or case law.128 But what happens if, as with Dodd-Frank,
there is just one implementing rule that itself suffers from ambiguity
(the Eligibility Rule), and the natural tendency to look to case law
has been discouraged in recent antitrust decisions? The remainder of

7 U.S.C. § 7A-1(c)(2)(N).
12 U.S.C. § 5303.
126 Two additional pieces of Dodd-Frank touch upon competition concerns—
the $50 million maximum capital requirement for DCO membership, see 17
C.F.R. 39.12(a)(2)(iii), and a proposal to set equity ownership limits in DCOs,
see Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract
Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts
of Interest, 75 Fed. Reg. 63732 (Oct. 18, 2010). But the former does not
dovetail with fair and open access, see supra, note 123, and the latter, framed
as a conflicts of interest issue, has languished in the rulemaking phase. Neither
are subjects of this Article’s focus.
127 See infra text accompanying notes 129-37.
128 See Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law, and
Proximate Cause, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2013).
124
125
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Subsection takes up the weaknesses of the Eligibility Rule, leaving
the relationship between Dodd-Frank and antitrust for the next
Subsection.
a.

Vagueness

Vagueness inheres in Dodd-Frank’s openness mandate. It
stems from the fact that the mandate’s implementation is fraught
with an extremely technical judgment call—how to strike the right
balance between open access and risk management.129 Indeed, in
announcing finalization of the Eligibility Rule, the CFTC indicated
that the rule was crafted to accomplish two goals: “(1) to provide for
fair and open access, while (2) limiting risk to the DCO and its
clearing members.”130
The Eligibility Rule calls out these strictures in subparts i and
iii, which note that fair and open access must account for the added
risk to the clearinghouse, as well as credit risk and deficiencies of the
prospective member.131 This balance makes sense as an operational
matter; for a clearinghouse serves to diffuse risk across a large and
diverse array of members.132 Yet a clearinghouse must also be
discerning about whom it admits to membership: entities which are
excessively leveraged relative to their credit profiles would do more
to introduce than mitigate risk.133 Whether a prospective member’s
risk profile counsels for exclusion instead of admission can vary
from clearinghouse to clearinghouse and member to member—and
even from time to time, as a clearinghouse might be less willing to
admit a member when the clearinghouse foresees an imminent
liquidity crunch.134
This balance between access and risk is prone to obfuscation
and, therefore, evasion of the principles embodied in the rule. In fact,
how to reconcile the two concerns—and, more broadly, Dodd-Frank
and competition policy—has confounded the industry since the
DCO Core Principles, supra note 82, at 69352.
Id. at 69415.
131 17 C.F.R. 39.12(a)(1)(i), (iii).
132 See DCO Core Principles, supra note 82, at 69415 (“[I]ncreased access to
clearing membership should reduce concentration at any one clearing
member and diversify risk.”). But for counterpoints from clearinghouse
detractors, see, e.g., Roe, supra note 27.
133 See Jesse Eisinger, Dodd-Frank’s Derivatives Reforms: Clear as Mud,
PROPUBLICA, Nov. 16, 2011, http://www.propublica.org/thetrade/item/doddfranks-derivatives-reforms-clear-as-mud (citing MF Global as a cautionary
tale of admitting small, undercapitalized clearing members).
134 See also see DCO Core Principles, supra note 82, at 69475-76 (illustrating
how the final rule also fails to account for differences in complexity between
products—e.g., agricultural versus credit default swaps) (dissent of
Commissioner Scott O’Malia).
129
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statute’s inception. During the 2010 CFTC Roundtable on
clearinghouses, intense debate centered on the ambiguity of the
statute in addressing the anticompetitive effects of major market
players. On one hand, smaller dealers worried that the dominant
dealers might stifle competition by setting clearinghouse
membership standards excessively high.135 Apart from competition
concerns, this would subvert the mitigation of systemic risk in the
derivatives markets that animates Dodd-Frank, mitigation which is
achieved by dispersing risk across broader pools of members.136 On
the other hand, legitimate concerns abound if a clearinghouse’s
standard-setting prerogative is eroded to the point where members
are admitted without due consideration to risk.137
When the CFTC promulgated the Eligibility Rule a year later,
the guidance was not particularly helpful. In some prongs, the rule
merely recites the fact that clearinghouses can balance open access
against risk.138 The final release for the Eligibility Rule proclaimed,
triumphantly, that the balance had been appropriately struck.139
However, Commissioner O’Malia issued a forceful dissent, citing to
a recent dispute between a clearinghouse and some derivatives
dealers over open access.140 Specifically, ICE Clear Credit had
changed its minimum capital requirement to $100 million but
simultaneously added a requirement that members hold a certain
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
See CFTC Roundtable, supra note 77, at 14-15 (“[E]conomic interests
should be set aside to mitigate systemic risk and protect the American public
against further financial calamity. In order to do that, it is more efficient to
bring transparency and open access and to allow more participants into the
market to diversify risk.”) (comments of Jason Kastner).
137 See id. at 15-16:
135
136

Certainly open access is an important part of the Dodd-Frank
Act, but it is certainly not the primary driver of the Act. I
think one of the biggest conflicts that has to be addressed
here is the conflict between open access and proper risk
management of the clearinghouse. . . [C]learinghouses are
going to be the ultimate repositories for all of the systemic
risk that was previously dispersed throughout the market. . .
[T]he members of the clearinghouse are ultimately the
parties that are underwriting this risk and responsible for
it.”) (comments of Jonathan Short, ICE Trust U.S., LLC)
See supra text accompanying note 131.
See DCO Core Principles, supra note 82, at 69352 (“Although there is
potential tension between the goals of ‘fair and open access’ and ‘sufficient
financial resources and operational capacity to meet obligations arising from
participation in the derivatives clearing organization,’ the Commission
believes the rules that it is adopting herein strike an appropriate balance.”).
140 Id. at 69475 (comments of Commissioner O’Malia).
138
139

4/6/2015 8:10 AM

SUBMISSION COPY

2015]

FINANCIAL MARKET BOTTLENECKS

29

amount of net capital.141 These changes were challenged by at least
two dealers for violating fair and open access.142 According to
Commissioner O’Malia, the final rule provided “very little guidance
on the criteria that the Commission will apply in adjudicating a
dispute such as this.”143
The ambiguity of the Eligibility Rule invites other concepts
and institutions to fill the void. One possibility is to push open access
toward bright-line rules, so that the mandate can revolve around
clearer orbits. For example, Dodd-Frank bars derivatives
clearinghouses from requiring more than $50 million in capital as a
condition of membership.144 As a technical matter, this prohibition
has nothing to do with open access;145 however, it has attracted a
great deal of attention from supporters and detractors of the
Eligibility Rule.146 Another possibility is that open access
determinations will be pushed toward federal courts, which might
hear antitrust claims brought by excluded clearinghouse
applicants.147
b.

Discretion of clearinghouses

At its best, the open-endedness of Dodd-Rank’s openness
mandate renders the mandate too nebulous. At its worst, however,
that open-endedness consigns too much power to the regulated
entities themselves, the clearinghouses.
It is the prerogative of a clearinghouse to set standards that
ensure access while mitigating risk. In that prerogative, there is
discretion. And with discretion, a clearinghouse can eviscerate open
access by excluding competitors of existing members under the
rubric of risk.
Invoking risk dispenses with every element of the Eligibility
Rule in one fell swoop. Because prongs i and iii of the rule expressly
condition access on risk mitigation, this is a permissible basis for
exclusion. Prong ii, which requires admitting members who meet
participation requirements, is not violated if risk management was
the justification for high bars to admission. Prongs iv and v, which
prohibit tying membership to being a swap dealer or attaining size or
volume thresholds, also do not come into play if a clearinghouse
excludes on the basis of risk.
That threshold was 5% of each member’s segregated consumer funds. Id.
Id.
143 Id.
144 See 17 C.F.R. 39.12(a)(2)(iii).
145 See DCO Core Principles, supra note 82, at 69476 n.307.
146 See, e.g., id. at 69474-76 (comments of Commissioner O’Malia);
Greenberger, supra note 13, at 254-61.
147 See infra Section III.C.
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How have the clearinghouses handled this discretion? Today,
three years have elapsed since the finalization of the Eligibility Rule.
Its progress in ensuring open access and diversifying the dealer
market can be assessed in two ways—by examining the membership
requirements of the dominant clearinghouses and the degree of
concentration in the dealer market.
As to the first benchmark, the capitalization requirement of
ICE Clear Credit challenged three years ago remains intact.148 An
affiliated clearinghouse, ICE Clear Europe, also imposes a tiered
capitalization structure that requires higher thresholds for certain
members or financial instruments.149 The persistence of these
conditions in the face of the Eligibility Rule suggests that the
clearinghouses have fended off challenges from regulators and
excluded applicants.150
Meanwhile, empirical evidence shows that the ancillary goal
of diversifying the dealer markets has clearly not come to pass.
According to the OCC’s quarterly reports of bank derivatives
positions, the same four institutions capture over 90% of the banking
industry’s total notional amount quarter after quarter, year after year.
In fourth quarter 2011, the year the Eligibility Rule was finalized,
those top four banks were JPMorgan Chase, Citibank, Bank of
America, and Goldman Sachs.151 Goldman Sachs, which held the
fourth spot, had derivatives exposures nearly 10 times greater than

Large members that qualify as futures commission merchants (“FCMs”) or
broker-dealers are to have at least $100 million in adjusted net capital and
more than 5% of segregated costumer funds as excess net capital. See ICE
Clear Credit, Clearing Rules § 201(b)(ii). Non-FCM or –broker-dealer members
are to bring $5 billion in tangible net equity to the table. Id.
149 See ICE Clear Europe, Membership Procedures § 3.1 (May 19, 2010)
(minimum capital requirement of $10 million for all clearing members);
Clearing Rules 201(i) (Dec. 1, 2014) (establishing additional requirements for
members clearing credit default swaps); CDS Procedures § 2.2(a) (May 19,
2010) (requiring a minimum of $5 billion in Tier 1 Capital).
150 Naturally, conclusions must be drawn with care. The persistence of high
financial requirements for membership might mean that the CFTC upheld
them against challenges for violating open access. Even so, this raises the
specter of regulatory capture; for risk management is sufficiently complicated
that regulators might not possess the expertise to scrutinize the
clearinghouses’ judgment. See Tuberville, supra note 89. Another spot check is
to look at whether the membership rosters of dominant clearinghouses have
changed. For SwapClear’s membership, see supra note 83.
151 See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC’S QUARTERLY REPORT ON
BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES, FOURTH QUARTER 2011 tbl.1 (2011).
148
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the bank holding the fifth spot, HSBC.152 This trend would continue
unabated in every quarter that has followed.153
The strategy of relying on clearinghouses to diversify the
downstream dealer market is an odd one. If ever there were a symbol
of the powerful derivatives dealers, it would be clearinghouses,
whose membership rosters read like a who’s-who of the largest
financial institutions in the world.154 Regulators obviously believe
there is a correlation between concentration and systemic risk,155 and
they may well have concluded that the Eligibility Rule’s roundabout
way of inducing diversification is the best tool available.156 The
strangest aspect of this strategy, however, which dooms the endeavor
altogether, is the regulators’ abdication of their standard-setting
duties to the regulated entities themselves.
c.

Enforcement

The complexity of risk management means that violations of
the Eligibility Rule are difficult for regulators to detect. Dodd-Frank
anticipates that compliance with the Core Principles will rest with the
chief compliance officer of each clearinghouse.157 Nonetheless,
because regulators do not possess the expertise to assess eligibility
determinations, the reliance on clearinghouses leaves the fox to
guard the proverbial henhouse.
If clearinghouse compliance
departments are not vigorous with their charge, then the CFTC’s
ability to impose civil monetary penalties and even deregistration is
rendered meaningless.158
To be sure, there are regulatory openness mandates and
antidiscrimination prescriptions in other areas of law. These
mandates seem to pose fewer problems so long as (i) the discretion
See id.
See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Quarterly Report on Bank
Derivatives Activities, http://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financialmarkets/trading/derivatives/derivatives-quarterly-report.html (follow the
link for each the quarterly report). Intermittently, there are slight variations—
e.g., in the order of the top four banks and the degree of separation between
the banks at the fourth and fifth spots.
154 See, e.g., supra notes 44 and 83.
155 See infra text accompanying note 277.
156 See Roe, supra note 27, at 1690 (“[B]uilding largely centralized
clearinghouses in the hope that (but not the certainty that) the industry will
de-concentrate seems a peculiar policy in its indirectness, although perhaps
regulators have concluded that they cannot otherwise induce market
restructuring and de-concentration.”).
157 See 17 C.F.R. § 39.10.
158 The authority of the CFTC to impose penalties against derivatives
clearinghouses can be found in the Commodity Exchange Act. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C.
§ 8(b) (deregistration); 17 C.F.R. § 143.8 (civil monetary penalties).
152
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of the regulated entities is limited, (ii) the benchmarks of openness
are objective and discernible, or (iii) a concomitant private right of
action helps ferret out the infractions. By contrast, Dodd-Frank
suffers from a deficit of all three.
In telecommunications, for example, the openness mandate
takes the form of a requirement upon all carriers to interconnect with
other carriers.159 Where negotiation between incumbents and
insurgents is necessary for interconnection, the negotiation will be
supervised by regulatory bodies and federal courts.160 And where
large carriers merge with one another, the FTC constitutes an
additional overlay of supervision to ensure open access.161
Comparison with discrimination law, too, is illuminating. Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits workplace discrimination
against protected classes of individuals, is enforced by an
administrative agency (the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission), but employees also enjoy a private right of action.162
Thus, Title VII has two pathways for enforcement: a regulator and
private plaintiffs, which often work in tandem.163
Comparison to counterparts elsewhere exposes two key
weaknesses in the enforcement of Dodd-Frank’s openness mandate.
First, mandates elsewhere are often blended with a private
right of action. This is a powerful enforcement tool because often the
entity best poised to detect a violation is that which has been
excluded or discriminated against.164 By contrast, there is no private
right of action for Core Principle C.165

See 47 U.S.C. § 201(a); Speta, supra note 90, at 247-48 (discussing the
Telecommunications acts of 1934 and 1996).
160 47 U.S.C. § 251; Speta, supra note 90, at 248.
161 Speta, supra note 90, at 235.
162 For the proportion of government- versus privately prosecuted
discrimination lawsuits, see J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private
Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1148-50
(2012).
163 Id.
164 See Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, 63 VAND. L.
REV. 675 (2010) (arguing that private enforcement puts the enforcers closer
to the relevant problems and permits individualized negotiation between
incumbents and insurgents). Note, though, that the literature on pairing
private and public enforcement, which is especially well developed in
antitrust, is deeply split. For a contrary position, see a.Stacey L. Dogan & Mark
A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685 (2009).
Detractors are most worried about cumulative overdeterrence, or duplication
of efforts between the plaintiffs’ bar and regulators. This concern will be taken
up infra in Section IV.B.4.
165 On the enforcement authority of the CFTC, see supra note 158 and
accompanying text.
159
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Second, the private right of action is sometimes found in
parallel doctrines under antitrust that are on the wane, as in
telecommunications regulation.166 Nevertheless, the regulators would
have shared many decades of cohabitation with antitrust.167 A history
of private enforcement history can help regulators become more
deliberative in their own policies.168 The coexistence of a robust
plaintiffs bar alongside the Federal Trade Commission and
Department of Justice, for example, has shaped the government’s
antitrust enforcement policy for decades169—even if the agencies and
the plaintiffs’ bar do not see eye-to-eye.
By contrast, Dodd-Frank has engrafted an openness mandate
onto financial reform laws, whose regulators do not have much
familiarity with, or institutional memory of, how to deal with
“openness.” The only rule that regulators have come up with so far,
the Eligibility Rule, is not only sparse but also nebulous.
C. Essential Facilities in Antitrust
The statutory openness mandate of Dodd-Frank is redolent of
the antitrust doctrine of essential facilities, which also has its roots in
the law of common carriers. Because of weaknesses in the regulatory
mandate, regulators and excluded applicants may turn to antitrust for
elucidation. Yet in the event of conflict between the regulatory
openness mandate and its pre-existing antitrust counterpart, current
Supreme Court precedent teaches that only regulation can prevail.
Essential facilities draws from 100 years of tortuous antitrust
case law,170 with the latest pronouncement casting doubt on its
continued vitality.171 Still, there is little disagreement over its
The most prominent example is essential facilities, which will be discussed
infra in Section III.C.
167 For instance, the Telecommunications Act, originally passed in 1934, and
the Sherman Act, which dates to 1890, enjoyed many years of cohabitation,
including decades before deregulation caught on.
168 See Glover, supra note 162, at 1159 (“even SEC commissioners
acknowledge that private enforcement plays a crucial role in regulating
securities fraud”), 1160 (“private parties, at least as a functional matter, are
often necessary for meaningful enforcement of regulatory directives to
occur”).
169 See id. at 1196-97 (“The DOJ relies heavily on antitrust wrongdoers to
come forward under its Amnesty Program for the remediation of conspiracyrelated harm, but the DOJ also relies on private enforcement to detect
instances of wrongdoing when parties are not so forthcoming.”).
170 Compare United States v. Terminal R.R Ass’n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 41113 (1912), Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 611
(1985), and Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 382 (1973),
with Trinko, 540 U.S. See also infra text accompanying notes 178-88.
171 See Trinko, 540 U.S. See also infra text accompanying notes 204-10.
166
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elements. An essential facilities claim is established if (i) a
monopolist controls a facility which (ii) a competitor is unable
practically or reasonably to duplicate and (iii) use of the facility is
denied to the claimant, even though (iv) it is feasible for the
monopolist to provide access.172 In the past, essential facilities has
been invoked to open up access to a railroad terminal,173 ski
slopes,174 electricity delivery,175 news wire membership,176 and local
telephone exchanges.177
Two relatively recent Supreme Court decisions upholding
lower court verdicts relying on the essential facilities doctrine were
Otter Tail in 1973 and Aspen Skiing in 1985. In the first case, Otter
Tail was a public utility that generated and sold electricity while
simultaneously wielding a monopoly over the transmission of
electricity.178 Otter Tail fought off attempts by municipalities to
circumvent its lock on the retail market—for example, municipalities
would buy electricity from other suppliers and ask Otter Tail to
“wheel,” or transmit, the electricity over Otter Tail’s own power
lines.179 The Department of Justice successfully sued Otter Tail for
monopolization of the retail power market by using its dominant
foothold in electricity transmission.180 In the second case, Aspen
Skiing owned three of the four major downhill skiing facilities in
Aspen, Colorado.181 For over a decade, Aspen Skiing or its corporate
predecessors had collaborated in a joint venture with its rival Aspen
Highlands, which owned the fourth major skiing facility.182 Yet in
1977, Aspen Skiing terminated the joint venture, and Aspen
Highlands sued successfully for monopolizing the market for
downhill skiing services.183
Curiously, the Supreme Court dodged the applicability of
essential facilities in both Otter Tail and Aspen Skiing. This was
despite the fact that the verdicts in both cases rested upon the
doctrine.184 In Otter Tail, the Court’s analysis unfolded along
MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983).
Terminal Railroad, 224 U.S.
174 Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S.
175 Otter Tail, 410 U.S.
176 Assoc. Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1945).
177 Trinko, 540 U.S.
178 410 U.S. at 368-71.
179 Id. at 370-71.
180 For a concise summary, see Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J. Gregory Sidak,
Essential Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1205-07 (1999).
181 472 U.S. at 587-95.
182 Id.
183 Id. For a concise summary, see Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 180, at 1207-11.
184 See United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. 54, 61 (D. Minn.
1971) (“Pertinent to an examination of the law is a reference to . . . the
‘bottleneck theory’ of antitrust law. This theory reflects in essence that it is an
172
173
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straightforward monopolization terms, and in Aspen Skiing, the Court
invoked alternative reasons for upholding the verdict, including the
lack of a valid business justification for exclusion.185 The reluctance
of the Court to confront the doctrine, even in an era that ushered in
the “high-water mark” of essential facilities,186 is illustrative.
Essential facilities is part of a broader duty to deal with rivals, whose
violation is typically prosecuted as monopolization under Section 2
of the Sherman Act. Yet the duty to deal stands on somewhat
incoherent footing, since the refusal to collaborate is generally the
prerogative of any business, even a monopolist’s. Further, even if
sharing is mandated under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
collaboration that rises to the level of conspiracy run can afoul of
Section 1.187 Not surprisingly, then, essential facilities has many
prominent detractors, and even its supporters are measured in its
application.188
For our purposes, however, the applicability of essential
facilities to FMIs is hardly farfetched, as two recent actions against
bottlenecks in the financial markets demonstrate. In 1996, La Poste,
the French post office, filed a complaint against SWIFT for refusing
membership.189 This came at a time when essential facilities was
rapidly gaining ground across the European Union.190 Shortly after
illegal restraint of trade for a party to foreclose others from the use of a scarce
facility.”); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 738 F.2d 1509
(10th Cir. 1984).
185 The Court noted that Aspen Skiing “was willing to sacrifice short-run
benefits and consumer goodwill in exchange for a perceived long-run impact
on its smaller rival.” 472 U.S. at 610-11.
186 See Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 180, at 1206.
187 See Maurer & Schotmer, supra note 20, at 3.
188 See Philip E. Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet In Need of Limiting
Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1990) (seminal article decrying essential
facilities), HOVENKAMP, supra note 33, at 246-48 (criticizing the doctrine even
in the face of deregulation); Frischmann & Waller, supra note 23 (advocating
revitalization of essential facilities only for certain infrastructures); Maurer &
Scotchmer, supra note 20 (arguing for forced sharing only where synergies
are enhanced).
189 Case No IV/36.120 – La Poste/SWIFT + GUF, Notice 97/C335/03 (Nov.
1997), OJ C335.
190 See, e.g., Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und
Zeitschriftenverlag MgbH & Co KG and others, Case C-7/1997, [1998] ECR I07791. Oscar Bronner, La Poste, and other cases from the European Union are
interesting counterpoints because the EU perspective begins with the
supremacy of competition policy, which is enshrined in the European
Community’s Treaty. As such, Europe’s financial reform regulations can only
inform the essential facilities doctrine, rather than supplant it. See Pierre
Larouche, Contrasting Legal Solutions and the Comparability of EU and US
Experiences 18, in ANTITRUST AND REGULATION IN THE EU AND US: LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES (François Lévêque & Howard Shelanski eds., 2009)
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La Poste’s filing, the European Commission joined in, arguing that
as the dominant international network transmitting payment
messages, SWIFT was an essential facility—one which had abused
its dominant position by imposing unjustified admission criteria.191
Within a year, the case was settled when SWIFT promised to grant
“full access . . . to any institution in the European Union which
provides cross-border payment services to the public and fulfills the
criteria laid down by the European Monetary Institute.”192 Such
access was to be complete and nondiscriminatory.193
More recently in the U.S., in July 2013, MF Global, the nowdefunct investment bank previously headed by Jon Corzine, sued
several large swap dealers, the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association (a derivatives industry trade group), and Markit Group (a
financial information services company) for conspiring to corner the
market in credit default swaps by, among other things, restricting
access to ICE Clear Credit, the dominant clearinghouse in the U.S.
for these instruments.194 The complaint framed ICE Clear Credit as a
bottleneck facility to which MF Global was unjustly denied access.
That litigation is pending in the Northern District of Illinois.
The challenge for claimants in the U.S., however, is that
essential facilities has been consistently scaled back by the Supreme
Court after Aspen Skiing. This movement culminated in the Court’s
2004 decision in Trinko. In Trinko, the defendant was an incumbent
local telephone service provider in New York City—one of the Baby
Bells that, after a series of mergers, became Verizon.195 By an odd
twist of history, the insurgent provider attempting to penetrate the
New York City local telephone market was AT&T, the carrier of
choice for claimant Curtis Trinko.196 Yet Verizon had denied AT&T
access to Verizon’s local telephone networks.197 Hence, Trinko filed
suit under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, claiming that Verizon failed
to supply rivals with the necessary network connections to service
customers of the rivals.198 The district court dismissed the claim for

See id.; TURING, supra note 33, at § 7.9.
Publication of an Undertaking Art. 1.1, Notice 97/C335/03 (Nov. 1997), OJ
C335,
available
at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:C1997/335/03&from=EN
[hereinafter
SWIFT Undertaking]. The European Monetary Institute was the predecessor
to the European Central Bank. TURING, supra note 33, at § 7.9.
193 SWIFT Undertaking, supra note 192, at Arts. 1.2, 1.3.
194 Complaint, MF Global Capital LLC v. Bank of America Corp., No. 1:13-cv5417 (N.D. Ill. 2013) [hereinafter MF Global Complaint].
195 540 U.S. at 402-05.
196 Id. at 404-05.
197 Id. at 403-05.
198 Id. at 405. For an excellent summary, see Shelanski, supra note 23, at 693706.
191
192
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failing to state an antitrust claim distinct from Verizon’s alleged
violation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which Trinko had
no standing to enforce.199 The Second Circuit reversed; construing
the pleadings liberally, the court proffered a number of independent
antitrust theories under which the complaint could have stated a
claim, including essential facilities and leveraging.200 When the
Supreme Court took up the issue, the Court found that, given the
pervasive federal regulatory framework, Trinko’s complaint failed to
state a claim under the antitrust laws.201 Then the Court went further,
denigrating the essential facilities doctrine in a portion of its dicta
that would become one of the most frequently quoted passages from
the case:
This conclusion would be unchanged even if we
considered to be established law the “essential
facilities” doctrine crafted by some lower courts . . .
We have never recognized such a doctrine, and we
find no need either to recognize it or to repudiate it
here.202
The Trinko majority’s dismissal of essential facilities is not
ironclad. In the hundred years since the Supreme Court first crafted a
sharing remedy in U.S. v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis,
several decisions have imposed a duty upon a bottleneck to deal with
rivals.203
More controversially, Trinko summarily countermands the
prior, well-established standard for resolving a conflict between
regulation and antitrust where both frameworks exist. That was the
“plain repugnancy” standard, developed in cases contemplating the
place of antitrust in the face of securities regulation. The earlier cases
on plain repugnancy strived for cohabitation of regulation and
antitrust, precluding the latter only where regulation was clearly preemptive.204 Later cases saw “plain repugnancy” evolve into simple
“repugnancy,” whereby actual conflict is not needed for antitrust to
Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 123 F. Supp .2d
738, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
200 305 F.3d 89, 108 (2d Cir. 2002).
201 540 U.S. at 416.
202 Id. at 410-11. Yet it is the passage’s conclusion that does far more damage:
“The 1996 Act's extensive provision for access makes it unnecessary to
impose a judicial doctrine of forced access. To the extent respondent's
“essential facilities” argument is distinct from its general argument, we reject
it.” Id. at 410-11.
203 These include both Supreme Court decisions such as Otter Tail and Aspen
Skiing, as well as lower court decisions such as MCI.
204 See, e.g., Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
199
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defer—just the potential for conflict with regulation suffices for preemption.205 In those cases, however, the regulations did not contain
express antitrust savings clauses, so the Court was grappling with
implied antitrust immunity.206 In Trinko, by contrast, the
Telecommunications Act provided that “nothing in this Act . . . shall
be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the applicability of any
of the antitrust laws,” a common antitrust savings clause.207
Astonishingly, Trinko superimposed the repugnancy effect onto
regulations where the intent of the drafters was to withhold antitrust
immunity by conferring a savings clause.208 Henceforth, the calculus
would not be whether potential conflict exists (often measured by the
pervasiveness of the regulation) but whether antitrust adds anything
at all (as measured by the costs of adding antitrust enforcement) if
regulation has already spoken.209 Thus, after Trinko, it has been
observed that “a little regulation can be a dangerous thing for
competition enforcement in regulated industries.”210
How can the two major trends identified in this Section be
reconciled? On one hand, the great transformation of regulated
industry has dismantled the age-old, if heavy-handed, mechanisms
for checking the abuses of natural monopolies, replacing the filed
rate doctrine with openness mandates. On the other hand, the dialing
back of antitrust alternatives such as essential facilities and the
concomitant expansion of antitrust immunity means that antitrust
will not fill the recesses from deregulation.211 What, then, is the place
of antitrust in regulated industries today, particularly if regulation is
neither expansive nor clear?
If the MF Global litigation portends anything, it is that
financial market bottlenecks will set the stage for courts to answer
the above questions.
In MF Global, denial of access to a clearinghouse was
alleged as the lynchpin for suppression of competition in the adjacent
dealer market. The complaint tracked the elements of an essential
facilities claim, but the plaintiffs’ attorneys refrained from
See Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
The most recent progeny of Silver and Gordon is Credit Suisse Sec. (USA)
L.L.C. v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007), where the majority saw the issue
presented as one of repugnancy, id. at 267-68, even though under the facts the
antitrust suit could not have conflicted with the securities laws, see Shelanski,
supra note 23, at 709.
207 540 U.S. at 406.
208 See id.
209 See id. at 413-15.
210 Shelanski, supra note 23, at 702.
211 See Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Regulatory Enterprise, 2004 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 335, 341 (2004) (“the natural result of deregulation is an increased
role for the antitrust laws”).
205
206
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classifying their claim as such. As their argument went, ICE Clear
Credit was a facility essential to the sale of credit default swaps by
virtue of the central clearing mandate; the facility was controlled by
the largest sellers of credit default swaps.212 Due to strong economies
of scale, the facility could not be duplicated.213 Its membership
requirements had been set unreasonably high, even though risk could
have been mitigated by less stringent standards.214 For example, ICE
Clear Credit required members to have at least $5 billion in adjusted
net capital.215 According to the complaint, “a flat $5 billion capital
threshold keeps out independent dealers and end users, whose ability
to clear CDS [credit default swaps] would enhance competition in
the making of CDS markets and would thereby lower CDS
spreads.”216
Those “spreads” tracked the profitability of incumbent
dealers; to keep the spreads wide, the defendants purportedly
foreclosed competitors from the dealer market with an
insurmountably high net capital requirement which kept them from
joining the clearinghouse. In substance, the MF Global suit
vindicated the academics and Justice Department attorneys who had
warned that clearinghouses would enable incumbent dealers to
foreclose competition from insurgents.217
The MF Global suit is also provocative in its timing, coming
a year after the finalization of the Eligibility Rule. The plaintiffs’
attorneys chose to pursue the private antitrust action notwithstanding
the presence of regulation on open access.218 This was the same
choice made by the plaintiff in Trinko—that is, to spell out an
essential facilities action even though the Telecommunications Act
provided a duty to deal in the form of interconnection to the
monopolist’s telephone network. Yet Trinko suggests that an
essential facilities claim will be rendered duplicative—and therefore
dismissed—every time there is an openness mandate in regulation. It
This would satisfy the first prong of essential facilities—control by a
monopolist or, arguably, a cartel.
213 This would satisfy the second prong of essential facilities—inability to
duplicate. As MF Global further alleged, the defendants had also conspired to
prevent the emergence of alternatives to ICE Clear Credit. See MF Global
Complaint, supra note 194, at para. 89-112.
214 This would satisfy the third and fourth prongs of essential facilities—
denial of access to a competitor despite the feasibility of providing access.
215 MF Global Complaint, supra note 194, at para. 66.
216 Id. at para. 68.
217 See, e.g., Greenberger, supra note 13; Christine A. Varney, Assist. Att’y Gen.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., Comments before the U.S. Commodity
Futures Trading Comm’n, Washington, D.C., (Dec. 28, 2010); U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, supra note 66.
218 Not surprisingly, MF Global included treble damages in its prayer for relief.
MF Global Complaint, supra note 194, at para. 13.
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is perhaps for this reason that MF Global never refers to essential
facilities by name, opting instead to channel its spirit.
MF Global therefore shows that there is a confluence of
trends propelling clearinghouses toward the forefront in the battles
over essential facilities and the relevance of antitrust. The next
decisive step in these battles may come from litigation against these
bottlenecks in the financial markets, where courts are forced to
define the precise contours of open access.
IV.

A PROPOSAL FOR RECONCILING OPENNESS MANDATES

With Dodd-Frank’s Core Principle C and Eligibility Rule,
lawmakers and financial regulators have imposed an openness
mandate to solve age-old problems (leverage, foreclosure) in a novel
setting (derivatives clearinghouses). This is an area where regulators
have had little experience administering openness mandates. In the
past, federal judges might have assisted with enforcement under the
Sherman Act. Yet Trinko scales back the ability of courts to
intervene where regulation has already spoken.
This Section argues that essential facilities claims should be
preserved as recourse against clearinghouses and their members for
wrongful denial of access, notwithstanding the existence of Core
Principle C and the Eligibility Rule. This proposal is a narrow one—
it merely argues for reconciliation of Dodd-Frank and essential
facilities. However, given dicta in Trinko which undercuts both
essential facilities as doctrine and the symbiosis of regulation and
antitrust, this proposal must be hitched to broader arguments which
refine, or even overhaul, Trinko.
This Section begins with a formulation of the narrow
proposal and discusses the justifications for, as well as opposition to,
the proposal. This Section then explores the necessary steps to bring
the proposal to fruition.
A. The Proposal
An openness mandate allows excluded applicants to a
financial market bottleneck to challenge the denial of access. This is
an easy proposition if competition laws are the only framework for
deterring the abuses of bottlenecks. But if there are also regulations
on point, then the proposition must be refined, and additional
justifications must be proffered for supplementing those regulations.
As applied to clearinghouses, then, this proposal can be
restated as follows: Permit the coexistence of the essential facilities
doctrine and the Eligibility Rule, so that excluded applicants to
clearinghouses can bring private antitrust actions.
How might this proposal be applied?
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If an applicant (say, a small derivatives dealer) applies to a
clearinghouse for membership and is denied, the applicant might
initiate a regulatory proceeding with the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (“CFTC”) against the clearinghouse. If successful, such
a proceeding may result in either a fine to the clearinghouse or
deregistration of the clearinghouse.219 Neither possibility is very
useful to the excluded applicant, who merely wants access to satisfy
Dodd-Frank’s clearing mandate and who likely cannot afford the
sunk costs of building a clearinghouse of its own.
Simultaneously, however, the applicant could also pursue a
private right of action against the clearinghouse and its members for
denial of access to an essential facility. If successful, the remedy
might be forced sharing, which enables the applicant to continue
with its core function of selling derivatives; or the remedy might be
damages, which either compensates for the additional costs of having
to find a surrogate to satisfy the clearing mandate220 or forces the
clearinghouse to the negotiation table to talk seriously about granting
access.221
B. Arguing the Proposal
1.

Complementing (versus duplicating) regulation

For clearinghouses, an antitrust openness mandate is wellsuited to complement the regulatory one. Regulators face an uphill
battle in patrolling and effectively remedying the duty of open,
nondiscriminatory access. The only tool in their arsenal is the
Eligibility Rule, a nebulous formulation which leaves much
discretion to the regulated entities themselves. The remedy, too, is
inappropriate, providing only for fines and deregistration.
The complementary nature of the Eligibility Rule and
essential facilities can be shown through a comparison of their
elements. The rule and the doctrine neither duplicate each other
entirely nor avoid overlap altogether; instead, combining the two
leads to more holistic enforcement of the openness mandate.
To begin with, there are elements of each mandate that can be
found in the other. Most importantly, the freedom of a clearinghouse
to balance risk under the Eligibility Rule is mirrored in essential
facility’s inquiry into “feasibility” of access in prong iv. 222 In an
essential facilities action, a clearinghouse must demonstrate why
admission of an applicant was infeasible; no doubt the applicant’s
See 7 U.S.C. § 8(b); 17 C.F.R. § 143.8.
This can be done by entering into another trade with a clearinghouse
member. However, the additional transaction incurs additional fees.
221 See Crane, supra note 164, at 707-09.
222 See supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
219
220
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risk profile would figure prominently in the clearinghouse’s
argument.
Yet the two mandates also bear unique traits. The Eligibility
Rule, understandably, features some detailed requirements which
adhere to a degree of specificity that is common for regulations but
not found in generalist antitrust doctrines. For instance,
clearinghouses cannot peg admission criteria to an applicant being a
derivatives dealer or hitting a certain notional threshold.223 For its
part, prong ii of essential facilities looks to the ease of duplication of
a clearinghouse,224 an inquiry absent in the regulatory counterpart.
Historically, this inquiry has been more the province of antitrust
enforcers than financial regulators; it introduces valid questions of
whether the applicant could or should just form its own
clearinghouse.225 Essential facilities would also subsume the
balancing of access and risk into a broader analysis of
“feasibility.”226 This approach might suggest ways of getting from
denial of access to granting of access. An applicant whose initial risk
profile militates toward denial might be rehabilitated so that it could
eventually be granted access. For instance, the clearinghouse might
give the applicant pointers on shoring up its risk mitigation
procedures. This flexibility would be provided for—even required—
in the element of “feasibility.”227
There are also institutional benefits that flow from letting the
two openness mandates work together. Essential facilities brings
along a century of precedent that has built up institutional familiarity
with the harms of denial of access, as well as experimentation with
different types of remedies. The record on deterrence has been

17 C.F.R. 39.12(a)(1)(v).
MCI Commc’ns Corp., 708 F.2d at1132-33.
225 Also associated with this is the complex question of whether open access
deters the DCO’s incentives to innovate. In general antitrust circles, the effects
of a robust duty to deal upon innovation are hotly contested. See Frischmann
& Waller, supra note 23, at 32; Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 180, at 1239-40. See
also The Uncertain Future of the Internet: Hearing before the H. Comm. on
Energy & Commerce (Feb. 15, 2015) (memo from Majority Committee Staff),
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF16/20150225/103018/HHRG-114IF16-20150225-SD002-U1.pdf.
226 “Feasibility” is the fourth element of essential facilities. See MCI Commc’ns
Corp., 708 F.2d at1132-33.
227 Note, however, that even the MCI court was unable to apply the feasibility
element and, instead, threw up its hands and deferred to regulators. See
Maurer & Schotmer, supra note 20, at 15. This Article’s proposal runs the risk
of the same happening. To prevent this, courts must apply their own analysis
on feasibility rather than repeating how the Eligibility Rule balances access
against risk.
223
224
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mixed,228 but it is a record that can help steer regulators toward more
flexible detection of anticompetitive effects as well as solutions for
such effects. For the massive, yet newly mandated derivatives
clearing industrial complex, essential facilities may also spur
rigorous examination of problems that financial regulators have
heretofore been unable to address—most prominently, concentration
in the derivatives dealer markets.229
Coexistence with antitrust improves not only the tools but
also the institutions of oversight. Among the notable advantages of
antitrust over regulation is a diminished likelihood of capture.230 The
too-big-to-fail nature of systemically significant clearinghouses
necessitates a close relationship with financial regulators, which in
turn makes them prone to regulatory capture.231 Without proper
institutional checks, the regulations designed to restrain
clearinghouses might morph into restraints against their
competitors.232
Of course, imposing an antitrust openness mandate introduces
complications of its own. Prong i in an essential facilities action,
control of a facility by a monopolist, presents an inquiry that the
Eligibility Rule avoids. Satisfying this prong would necessitate
finding that a small group of dealer-members not only controls a
clearinghouse but adequately constitutes a “monopolist.”233 Yet
group action is typically governed under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, while single-firm conduct falls under Section 2’s prohibition
against monopolization.234 This oddity replicates the conflation of
See, e.g., Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 180, at 1195–96 (discussing the
difficulty of crafting the appropriate remedy in Terminal Railroad).
229 For instance, judicial scrutiny into the reasonableness of denial of access
and forcing the excluded applicant to build its own facility might push the
industry toward consensus on the grounds for exclusion. This has happened
where licensing is heavily utilized: the industry settles upon a norm, and
antitrust checks those norms for anticompetitive effects. See Frischmann &
Waller, supra note 23, at 38-39.
230 For an exploration of regulatory capture in the promulgation of telecom
interconnection mandates, see Candeub, supra note 23, at 860 (detailing how
the Baby Bells sought regulation by the Federal Communications Commission
under the belief that the regulator was more lax than antitrust prosecutors).
231 See Lubben, supra note 99 (arguing that it is unimaginable for large
clearinghouses to fail without being bailed out).
232 See Crane, supra note 164, at 707 (quoting Alfred Kahn on regulation’s
contradictory impulses toward monopoly).
233 But see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 336 (2011) at 336 (“once a properly defined
‘essential facility’ is at issue, it really should not matter whether the facility is
controlled by a single firm or a group of firms acting in concert”).
234 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2. For a thorough discussion, see Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion
as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 527, 532-35 (2013).
228
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sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act that has muddled the essential
facilities doctrine and inspired its detractors.235 More complicated
still is the prospect that to fully tease out concerted action by dealermembers, we have to turn to debates around parallel exclusion,236 as
well as collusion versus exclusion,237 which is more controversy than
we have room to take on here.
Let us not lose sight of the bigger picture, however. For all
the ancillary debates that essential facilities entails, those debates are
fresh ways of looking at the problem of FMIs as a node of vertical
integration, particularly the integration of the derivatives dealer
market with the derivatives clearing market. Coexistence with
antitrust would lend these perspectives, as well as a wealth of
experience in crafting remedies.
2.

Undercutting risk management

A powerful counterargument, however, is that paring a
regulatory openness mandate with essential facilities undercuts the
ability of a clearinghouse to manage risk. Because a denied applicant
could pursue a private right of action, the clearinghouse must now
contemplate antitrust when making eligibility determinations.
This concern is backed by valid considerations. After all,
regulators settled upon a rule that they felt appropriately balances the
diametric interests—balance which might be upset if an antitrust
claim is in the mix.238 If small traders force their way into a
clearinghouse by way of open access, then the other members and
the clearinghouse itself might be imperiled.
To some extent, however, the mechanics of a properly
functioning clearinghouse mitigates those perils. For example,
collateral requirements should prevent trades from becoming highly
leveraged. Even if trades by smaller members were not adequate
collateralized, the default fund should stave off exposure to other
members.239
Here is another way to conceptualize what is at stake: The
fallout of admitting smaller members might be that some of them
default and other members are called upon to augment the default
fund.240 On the other hand, the fallout of preserving the status quo,
See infra note 187-88 and accompanying text.
See Hemphill & Wu, supra note 67.
237 See Baker, supra note 234.
238 See DCO Core Principles, supra note 82, at 69352. Ultimately, it is not the
province of regulators to determine how regulation squares with antitrust;
this is a decision for lawmakers and the courts.
239 For a much heralded example of the default fund at work, see de Terán,
supra note 79; LCH.Clearnet, supra note 79.
240 See Lubben, supra note 99, at 10-11.
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where dominant derivatives dealers have a lock on clearinghouses, is
that risk will not be properly dispersed. Thus, if a large dealer
defaults, the damage cannot be dissipated.241 Concentration in the
dealer market was the norm prior to the financial crisis, and it
remains the norm today;242 Dodd-Frank has simply interposed the
additional layer of clearinghouses, which, ironically, works to
cement the status quo.
One way to interpret the centralization of clearinghouse
membership among a small group of dominant dealers is that the
clearinghouses have successfully weeded out risky applicants. The
other way to read this is Tirole’s: that the clearinghouse membership
profile replicates and reinforces concentration in the downstream
dealer market.243 The latter interpretation is backed by not just
theory, but also evidence from other vertically integrated
industries.244
Of course, the derivatives clearing industry may be different
enough that financial regulators should have the exclusive say on
how competition policy fits. Certainly there are traits unique to this
industry, whose prerogative to manage financial risk has implications
not only for competition, but also for the stability of the global
economy. Many balancing acts are at work in Dodd-Frank’s
openness mandate. Admittedly, it may be too early to discern the
proper balance between access and risk—we may need more time to
see how the clearing market (and, by implication, the adjacent
trading market) evolves.245 This Article merely suggests that it would
241

See CFTC Roundtable, supra note 77, at 47-48:
The problem with the clearinghouse is not when your
smallest clearing member fails. The problem with the
clearinghouse is when your highly interconnected, large
[clearinghouses fail] . . . . So, the notion somehow that you
should restrict arbitrarily membership to a clearinghouse
such that you have more connected, larger, systemically
important institutions who are highly correlated is patently
wrong. (comments of Jason Kastner)

In theory, clearinghouse mechanics should take care of this risk, as the CFTC
requires clearinghouses to be sufficiently capitalized to withstand the default
of its largest one or two members. See 17 C.F.R. § 39.29. In practice, however,
many are skeptical that if the largest members fall, the clearinghouse will still
be able to stand. See, e.g., Lubben, supra note 99.
242 See supra text accompanying notes 151-53.
243 See supra notes 44, 83.
244 See, e.g., Wolkoff & Werner, supra note 97 (futures exchanges); Crawford,
supra note 94 (telecommunications).
245 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Statement of the Commission 12
(Mar.
6,
2013),
available
at
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be foolhardy to bide the time by leaving the dominant derivatives
dealers to their anticompetitive devices.
3.

Perverse incentives for derivatives users

Another powerful counterargument is that perverse incentives
would be created for consumers of derivatives—end-users, hedgers,
and even speculators—if these clearinghouses submit to regulatory
and antitrust openness mandates. Open-access clearing ostensibly
results in competition in the dealer market. Competition in the dealer
market, in turn, lowers prices for derivatives instruments.246
In other paradigms, lower price coheres with consumer
welfare, the driving justification for breaking up monopolies.247
Consumer welfare is gauged by increased consumption, particularly
of a resource made either artificially scarce or artificially expensive
by a monopoly.248
For derivatives, however, the calculus is different. The
resource being consumed is a financial instrument with complex,
often hidden risks249 that has been maligned as “financial weapons of
mass destruction.”250 Lower prices for derivatives means greater
consumption—usually by two types of “consumers.”251 One type is
consumers who might not need derivatives or understand their risks.
Yet they might be induced to purchase if the prices are not
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6525-13 (follow link to
“Statement of the Commission”) (approving Rule 1001 in CME’s Rulebook but
noting that the rule’s anticompetitive effects may not manifest until some time
has passed). The controversy over CME Rule 1001 is one of the most
interesting developments in recent months. The rule permits CME’s
clearinghouse to report data on cleared swaps to its vertically integrated swap
data repository. The controversy has revealed how the CFTC handles
complaints against a large clearinghouse alleging violations of Core Principle
N (antitrust considerations).
246 See Erik Gerding, Derivatives: Learning to love anti-competitive behavior?,
THE
CONGLOMERATE
(Aug.
2,
2013),
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2013/08/derivatives-learning-to-loveanti-competitive-behavior.html.
247 BERG & TSCHIRHART, supra note 58, at 24-30, 288-89. See also John B.
Kirkwood and Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting
Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, (2008).
248 See SULLIVAN GRIMES, supra note 58.
249 See Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 337-73.
250 Warren E. Buffett, Letter the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 13
(Feb.
21,
2003),
available
at
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2002pdf.pdf.
251 See FRANK PARTNOY, F.I.A.S.C.O.: BLOOD IN THE WATER ON WALL STREET (2010)
(characterizing buyers of derivatives as either “cheaters” or “widows and
orphans”).
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prohibitive.252 Another type is consumers who trade derivatives for
purely speculative purposes.253 They might be induced to double
down on their positions if the instruments are cheap enough.
Some of these risks can be averted by other provisions in
Dodd-Frank. Purchase of derivatives by certain consumers—for
example, government entities and pension plans—triggers certain
duties among dealers, including the requirement to place the
purchasers’ interests above the dealers’ interests.254 These duties
should mitigate risks to some consumers.
Further, the clearing function itself works to reduce risk by
standardizing derivatives instruments.255 Clearing demands that
instruments be fungible enough so that if one party to a trade
defaults, an unrelated party can buy into that position.256 Fungibility
reduces information asymmetries, increases transparency in pricing,
and thereby dampens risk.257
A related argument is that natural monopoly regulation is an
improper theoretical framework for clearinghouses because these
facilities do not interface with the public interest. The foundational
works on natural monopolies justified their regulation on the bases of
sunk costs and public goods.258 That is, natural monopolies must
provide useful services such as electricity that cannot be widely
The inducement might come via tying—for example, a lender only extends
a loan if the borrower also purchases an interest rate swap. See Felix B. Chang,
Death to Credit as Leverage: Using the Bank Anti-Tying Provision to Curb
Financial Risk, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 851 (2013).
253 See Timothy E. Lynch, Gambling by Another Name; The Challenge of Purely
Speculative Derivatives, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 67 (2011).
254 See 17 C.F.R. 23.400 et seq.; Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers
and Major Swap Participants with Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. 9734 (Feb. 17,
2012).
255 Craig Pirrong, The Economics of Clearing in Derivatives Markets: Netting,
Asymmetric Information, and the Sharing of Default Risks through a Central
Counterparty
10
(2009),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1340660.
256 Id. See also DCO Core Principles, supra note 82, at 69361 (“The Commission
believes that standardizing products . . . will increase liquidity, lower prices,
and increase participation. In addition, standardized products should make it
easier for members to accept a forced allocation in the event of bankruptcy.”).
257 See generally Zachary J. Gubler, The Financial Innovation Process: Theory
and Application, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55 (2011). The counterargument to this is
that innovation, and therefore risk, will migrate elsewhere. For example,
clearinghouses might choose to keep certain instruments unclearable so as to
maximize the dealer’s cut; or financial institutions might devise new
instruments not encapsulated by mandatory clearing. Risk does not diminish
but is pushed elsewhere. But standardized instruments are not free of risk.
The speculation in silver futures in the 1980s shows that fungible, exchangetraded instruments too can wreak havoc.
258 See SPULBER, supra note 58, at 4.
252
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dispensed without government protection from competition.259
Whether centrally cleared derivatives are a public good is far from
settled. Derivatives might be widely consumed at staggering
volumes, but they are often lambasted as little more than gambling.
If the clearing grid makes it easier to transact in instruments so
closely associated with financial crises,260 its value may be dubious.
4.

Expansiveness of regulation

The proposal to pair essential facilities with the Eligibility
Rule can be justified within the existing framework of regulatory
pre-emption of antitrust. While Dodd-Frank as a whole is expansive,
its pronouncements on competition are sparse, consisting only of
Core Principles C and N, the antitrust savings clause, and the
Eligibility Rule.261 The lean regulatory framework on competition
suggests that antitrust is not to be displaced.
Prior to Trinko, Supreme Court precedent on antitrust
immunity looked either to the expansiveness of the regulatory
scheme or to the potential for conflict between regulation and
antitrust.262 Neither approach was overruled by Trinko.263 Rather,
Trinko pivots toward comparing the costs and benefits of antitrust if
regulation already exists.264 Thus, there are three ways of considering
regulatory pre-emption of antitrust: (i) pervasiveness of regulation,
(ii) potential for conflict, and (iii) additional benefits conveyed by
antitrust.
Regarding the first possibility, as noted above, Dodd-Frank’s
provisions on competition are hardly pervasive. The Eligibility Rule
is a far cry from the “extensive provision for access” under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 that the Supreme Court invoked to
justify its refusal to sanction judicially imposed access.265 Three
years after Trinko, the Supreme Court decided Credit Suisse v.
Billing, which provided four factors to determine whether regulation
See id.
FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE
FINANCIAL MARKETS (2009) (Orange County, California and Procter & Gamble
interest rate swaps debacles); Kyle Whitmire & Mary Williams Walsh, High
Finance Backfires on Alabama County, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/12/business/12bama.html?_r=1&fta=y
(Jefferson County, Alabama interest rate swaps debacle).
261 Trinko itself points to the “existence of a regulatory structure designed to
deter and remedy anticompetitive harm,” 540 U.S. at 412 (emphasis added),
rather than the expansiveness of the entire regulation.
262 E.g., Silver, 373 U.S.; U.S. v. National Assn. of Securities Dealers (“NASD”), Inc.,
422 U.S. 694 (1975).
263 See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412 (citing Silver and NASD with approval).
264 See id. at 411-12 (citing Silver to support this approach).
265 Id. at 411.
259
260

4/6/2015 8:10 AM

SUBMISSION COPY

2015]

FINANCIAL MARKET BOTTLENECKS

49

should trump antitrust: (i) the existence of regulatory authority to
supervise the conduct in question, (ii) evidence that regulators
exercise that authority, (iii) the risk of conflicting results from
applying antitrust, and (iv) whether the conduct falls within the
activities governed by regulation.266 Credit Suisse saw itself as
following prior implied antitrust immunity cases premised upon the
pervasiveness of the securities laws.267 Hence, these four factors can
help parse whether the Eligibility Rule too is sufficiently
“pervasive.” Here the Eligibility Rule falls short. Despite the
existence of regulation on point (factors i and iv), the persistence of
questionable clearinghouse membership requirements and
concentration in the dealer markets268 is evidence suggesting that
regulators have not exercised their authority (factor ii).269
Regarding the second possibility for construing pre-emption
(the potential for conflict), it must be conceded that the
complementary relationship between the Eligibility Rule and
essential facilities could, in some circumstances, lead to disparate
findings. For instance, the CFTC might not challenge a
clearinghouse’s exclusion of an applicant, but the applicant could
turn to federal court, file an action against the clearinghouse under
antitrust laws, and prevail. This would be the nightmare scenario that
motivates the critics of a parallel private right of action under
antitrust law. Such critics fear that antitrust would engender false
positives270 and cumulative overdeterrence,271 as well as invade the
purview of regulators.272
Nonetheless, we can accept a result of inconsistency if it
stems from the inability of the CFTC to enforce the Eligibility
Rule.273 In that case, antitrust would stave off the false negatives of
underenforcement.274 There can also be no overdeterrence if
regulators do not deter in the first place.
We can also accept inconsistency if it furthers the CFTC’s
mandate under the Eligibility Rule. Indeed, in the final release
announcing the promulgation of the rule, the CFTC noted that “[t]he
See 551 U.S. at 275-76. For critics of Trinko, Credit Suisse is no les
problematic in its approach toward antitrust immunity. See Shelanski, supra
note 23, at 706-10.
267 551 U.S. at 275-76 (citing Gordon and NASD).
268 See supra Section III.B.2.
269 Factor iii from Credit Suisse, the potential for conflict between regulation
and antitrust, is discussed in the next paragraph.
270 See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412-14.
271 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 164, at 705 n.88 and accompanying text.
272 For a nuanced analysis, see Glover, supra note 162, at 1180 (discussing
when regulators possess informational advantages).
273 See id. at 1203-04.
274 Shelanski, supra note 23, at 711-13.
266
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Commission has crafted the provisions of § 39.12 . . . to establish a
regulatory framework that it believes can ensure that a DCO’s
participation requirements do not unreasonably restrict any entity
from becoming a clearing member while, at the same time, limiting
risk to the DCO and its clearing members.”275 And yet, in the very
next sentence, the release clarified that “The Commission expects
that more widespread participation will reduce the concentration of
clearing member portfolios, thereby diversifying risk, increasing
market liquidity, and increasing competition among clearing
members.”276 That is, competition in the dealer market, too, is a goal
of the rule. Unfortunately, the rule that the agency arrived at is a
weak mechanism for ensuring competition, one that would work well
in tandem with antitrust. The elements of essential facilities could
undertake broader contemplation of vertical exclusion, the ability to
replicate a clearinghouse, and competition in the adjacent dealer
market.
At its most benign, then, a contradictory result might be
traced to the weakness of the Eligibility Rule or the difficulty of
catching an infraction—glitches which can be backstopped by a
private right of action. Of course, at its most destructive, a false
positive under antitrust might force a clearinghouse to expose itself
to excessive risk. Recent scholarship has advanced a number of
findings that temper the reality of false positives,277 thereby making
this tradeoff more palatable.
Regarding the third possibility for construing pre-emption
(additional benefits from antitrust), there is much that a resuscitated
essential facilities doctrine can offer alongside the Eligibility Rule.
Among other things, antitrust would lend novel perspectives on
looking at the harms of leverage and foreclosure, which the CFTC is
not accustomed to dealing with.
5.

Antitrust savings clause

Core Principle N and the antitrust savings clause reflect clear
Congressional intent to sustain the applicability of antitrust law. In
fact, Dodd-Frank’s rather slim competition-related provisions should
settle the convoluted wrangling over whether regulation is
sufficiently expansive to displace antitrust. The majority of cases on
antitrust immunity actually involve implied immunity, where the
statute on point does not have an antitrust savings clause or a savings
clause that refers explicitly to the antitrust laws.278 Here, Dodd-Frank

DCO Core Principles, supra note 82, at 69352.
Id.
277 E.g., Shelanski, supra note 23, at 711-13.
278 See Silver, 373 U.S.; Gordon, 422 U.S.; and Credit Suisse, 551 U.S.
275
276
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contains such a savings clause, and while the clause does not
necessarily operate to bar any finding of plain repugnancy,279 the
existence of such a clause should nudge courts toward trying harder
to reconcile antitrust with regulation.
The backdrop of how Dodd-Frank’s antitrust savings clause
came to pass is salient. Prior to Dodd-Frank, the restriction on
imposing a material anticompetitive burden had been limited to
designated contract markets (“DCMs”).280 DCMs are platforms such
as exchanges and boards of trade which quote the trading prices of
futures or options contracts.281 DCMs have existed for over a
century; prominent ones include the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
(“CME”) and the Chicago Board of Trade.282 In the academic
discipline of industrial organization, some DCMs have become
synonymous with inefficiency and abuse of dominance.283 This is
because many run their own clearinghouses. For instance, CME
dominates the market for selling certain treasury futures.284 CME’s
proprietary clearinghouse, known as CME Clearing, only clears and
settles products sold by CME the futures dealer.285 If an upstart
wanted to sell the same types of agricultural futures, it would have to
go to another clearinghouse or form its own.286
Prior to Dodd-Frank, the antitrust considerations of Core
Principle N governed only DCMs. Then in 2010, Section 725 of
Dodd-Frank extended this principle to clearinghouses. The extension
reflects a commitment from Dodd-Frank’s drafters to protect
competition. Against the backdrop of vertical foreclosure in the
futures industry and now clearinghouses for over-the-counter
derivatives, the antitrust savings clause appears all the more
compelling.

Shelanski, supra note 23, at 693 (analyzing the Second Circuit decision in
Trinko, which advocated such a position).
280 See Core Principles and Other Requirements for Designated Contract
Markets, 77 Fed. Reg. 36612, 36657 (June 19, 2012).
281 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Designated Contract Markets
(DCMs),
http://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/TradingOrganizations/DCMs/index.
htm (last accessed Feb. 26, 2015).
282 See CFTC, Trading Organizations - Designated Contract Markets (DCMs),
http://sirt.cftc.gov/SIRT/SIRT.aspx?Topic=TradingOrganizations&implicit=tr
ue&type=DCM&CustomColumnDisplay=TTTTTTTT (last accessed Feb. 26,
2015).
283 See, e.g., Wolkoff & Werner, supra note 97, at 313.
284 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 66, at 10-16.
285 Id.
286 Id.
279
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6.

Established nature of the antitrust openness mandate

Control of a bottleneck facility in an upstream market helps
the monopolist in a downstream market maintain its dominance. This
is a classic case of leveraging that fits within the caveat that Trinko
left open for causes of action under “existing antitrust standards.”287
As a matter of doctrine, leveraging is a form of exclusion,
whose rules have long been controversial in competition policy.288
The detractors of exclusion have been many and prominent.289 The
various tropes of exclusion, from tying to leverage to margin
squeeze, have alternately fallen into and out of favor, with the latest
volley coming from Rey and Tirole—and, in 2014, vindication of
their view by Tirole’s Nobel Prize.
As a matter of history, the lineage of exclusion is long and
storied. For all the fluctuations in academic trends, exclusion fits
squarely within existing antitrust standards.290 The seminal case on
essential facilities, Terminal Railroad, recently celebrated its 100th
birthday, and it was not that long ago that the high-water-mark of
this doctrine was reached in Otter Tail and Aspen Skiing.
Yet characterizing essential facilities as an “established”
cause of action runs up against Trinko. The majority in Trinko
minced no words in its skepticism toward monopolization and dutyto-deal claims.
The majority characterized the duty-to-deal
precedent as “at or near the outer boundary of [Sherman Act] § 2
liability”;291 then it proceeded to dismantle Aspen by reading it as
imposing several high bars for plaintiffs.292 In the few paragraphs
between the decision’s two frequently quoted passages on essential

See 540 U.S. at 407 (“just as the 1996 Act preserves claims that satisfy
existing antitrust standards, it does not create new claims that go beyond
existing antitrust standards.”).
288 Baker, supra note 234, at 534-35.
289 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
290 One might take issue with Trinko’s insistence on existing antitrust
standards; for it freezes antitrust law in 2004, preventing new doctrines from
ever evolving. But for our purposes, the more modest approach of trying to fit
leveraging claims against clearinghouses within Trinko’s precepts suffices.
291 540 U.S. at 409.
292 Trinko appears to require (i) a pre-existing course of dealing prior to
exclusion and (ii) sacrificing of short-term profits for long-term dreams of
monopoly. See Eleanor M. Fox, Is There Life in Aspen after Trinko? The Silent
Revolution of Section 2 under the Sherman Act, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 153, 167
(2005).
287
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facilities,293 the Court all but obliterated the doctrine, articulating a
test that Aspen’s own facts could not have passed.294
In the end, all justifications for the essential facilities doctrine
must come to a head by confronting Trinko.
C. Broader Arguments to Refine Trinko
This Article calls for utilizing antitrust to shore up the
regulatory openness mandate. Yet this cannot be done without
rethinking Trinko. Trinko blocks the coexistence of Dodd-Frank and
essential facilities at every turn. Under the majority opinion, antitrust
can hardly complement regulation if regulation has already spoken,
and essential facilities has been whittled to a shred of its former self
under Aspen. In so starkly cabining the prior antitrust frameworks,
Trinko itself must be cabined if the proposal herein is to come to
pass.
A number of critics have advanced arguments for dealing
with Trinko.295 There are, therefore, several possibilities to choose
from. This Subsection summarizes a few of them, tailoring the
application to clearinghouses.
One set of possibilities is to more clearly demarcate the
realms of regulation and antitrust, as well as the permissible
overlaps. This might be achieved by defaulting to courts to read
Trinko narrowly. To this end, courts could require that regulation
truly be expansive, as well as precise, in its contemplation of
competition in order to displace antitrust. This alternative has been
explored here and also by Howard Shelanski.296 Its drawback is that
implementation rests the lower courts, which could read “expansive”
divergently, eventually requiring the Supreme Court to step in
again.297 But that is not a bad result, as it would force the Supreme
Court to reconsider rather problematic precedent.298
Another set of possibilities is to revitalize essential facilities
directly. Brett Frischmann and Spencer Waller, for instance, have
Specifically, that “Aspen Skiing is at or near the outer boundary of § 2
liability,” 540 U.S. at 409, and that the Court has “never recognized such a
doctrine,” id. at 410.
294 See Fox, supra note 292, at 162-67.
295 See infra text accompanying notes 296-302.
296 See Shelanski, supra note 23, at 730.
297 Id. Alternatively, as Shelanski has also suggested, Congress could step in to
establish clearer standards for antitrust immunity. Id. at 730-31.
298 The post-Trinko cases suggest that the current state of affairs is a morass.
See Robert A. Skitol, Three Years after Verizon v. Trinko: Broad Dissatisfaction
with the Whole Thrust of Refusal to Deal Law, 6-APR ANTITRUST SOURCE 1
(2007); Sandeep Vaheesan, Reviving an Epithet: A New Way Forward for the
Essential Facilities Doctrine, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 911 (2010).
293
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defended the use of essential facilities to open up access to certain
infrastructures if the infrastructures create social value when utilized
productively in the downstream market.299 This is a variation of an
older argument that access to public goods should be granted in a
nondiscriminatory manner.300 Spencer and Waller’s infrastructure
theory is not particularly controversial for hard infrastructures,
which, traditionally, essential facilities have tended to be (e.g., roads,
bridges, connections to the local telephone network). Clearinghouses
are less physically tangible, though the upside is that they are not as
prone to capacity problems. As applied to derivatives products,
infrastructure theory also leads to interesting conversations about the
social value of derivatives, which is not universally accepted.
More recently, essential facilities has been reimagined as a
tool for creating synergies among the entities sharing access, so that
consumer value is enhanced and costs reduced.301 The peculiarities
of the derivatives markets obviate some of the problems that come
with the synergy theory—for example, sharing should not be
encouraged if it would lead to congestion of the facility, a concern
that is likely irrelevant for clearinghouses. But those peculiarities
also raise additional considerations, such as the incentives upon
consumers of derivatives if those products are less costly and more
widely available.302
A constant thread that runs through most of these options is
the need to bolster essential facilities—to defend it from the
onslaught of Trinko and bring it back from the brink of extinction.
Some advocates have proffered an approach by Judge Posner as a
measured way of resuscitating essential facilities. In Olympia
Equipment Leasing Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,303 decided
nearly two decades before Trinko, Posner focused on whether refusal
to cooperate hurts competition because access to necessary facilities
is denied.304 For derivatives clearinghouses, the answer is a yes: the
central clearing mandate renders clearinghouses necessary, and
See Frischmann and Waller, supra note 23, at 14. Infrastructure theory is
comprised of three conditions: (i) the infrastructure-resource may be
consumed non-rivalrously, (ii) social demand for the resource is driven
primarily by downstream productive activity that requires the input of the
resource, and (iii) the resource is an input into a wide range of goods and
services. Id. at 12. This theory surfaced in earlier form in Waller’s challenge of
Areeda’s conception of essential facilities. See Spencer Weber Waller, Areeda,
Epithets, and Essential Facilities, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 359 (2008).
300 See Speta, supra note 90; Crawford, supra note 94.
301 See Maurer & Schotmer, supra note 20, at 4. For the elements of their
theory, see id. at 26.
302 See supra Section IV.B.3.
303 797 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1986).
304 See id. at 377; Skitol, supra note 298, at 9-10. This is in contrast with the
hurdles imposed upon Aspen. See supra note 291.
299

4/6/2015 8:10 AM

SUBMISSION COPY

2015]

FINANCIAL MARKET BOTTLENECKS

55

denial of access hurts competition in the largest financial markets in
the world. Even a modest revival of essential facilities by way of
Posner’s approach would go a long way toward leveling the playing
field in those markets.
V.

CONCLUSION

The stakes are high for safeguarding open access to
derivatives clearinghouses, a type of financial market infrastructure
that sits at the intersection of several major trends. If financial
regulators fail to catch improper denials of access, the consequence
isn’t simply that traders do not gain access to clearinghouses or the
dealer market is not as diverse—the consequence is also that the
derivatives markets continue to be concentrated in a small number of
systemically significant financial institutions. Today, several
financial markets exhibit a high degree of concentration, with the
vast majority of market share typically being taken up by the same
entities. The top derivatives dealers, for example, also happen to be
the largest commercial banks and the most powerful clearinghouse
members. For all the reforms in Dodd-Frank, the act does little to
dissipate the concentration in the dealer market.
The only tool that regulators have is the Eligibility Rule, a
relatively new rule whose effectiveness depends on the discretion of
the regulated clearinghouses. If, by way of essential facilities actions,
competitors in the much more lucrative dealer market are permitted
to also check the exclusionary impulses of the dominant dealers and
their naturally monopolistic clearinghouses, then essential facilities
and the Eligibility Rule would have gone further than any
combination of financial regulation and antitrust before it. By
Trinko’s own cost-benefit analysis, the coexistence of antitrust and
regulation would be justified.

